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# West Europe Report

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## SDP FOREIGN POLICY SPOKESMAN BUDTZ DISCUSSES NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 14 Jan 81 p 5

[Article: "SDT's Budtz: No Separate Nuclear-Free Zone"]

[Text] The Baltic nations in particular must be included in any agreement on a nuclear-free zone in the view of Lasse Budtz, foreign policy spokesman for the Social Democrats.

"I don't regard it as realistic to work for a nuclear-free zone in the North unless these efforts include the surrounding areas, primarily the Baltic. The idea of an isolated nuclear-free North is meaningless," foreign policy spokesman for the Social Democrats Lasse Budtz told INFORMATION against the background of the renewed debate on the formation of a nuclear-free zone in Europe and Scandinavia. The subject was discussed recently by representatives of the Social Democratic parties of Norway, Denmark, Holland and Belgium at a meeting in Amsterdam. Representing Denmark were Foreign Minister Kjeld Olesen and Folketing member Lasse Budtz.

Lasse Budtz stressed to INFORMATION that the meeting was of a purely informative nature without decisions or concrete political initiatives. When Kjeld Olesen, Anker Jorgensen and Lasse Budtz meet the chairman of the West German Social Democrats Willy Brandt today it will also be a purely informative meeting that will not lead to any decisions, Budtz said.

#### Baltic Sea

After the meeting in Amsterdam Kjeld Olesen conceded that in principle he supports the idea of a treaty-like agreement on a nuclear-free zone in Europe in order to safeguard the status of northern Europe as a nuclear-free area. The prerequisites for such an agreement, according to the foreign minister, are an agreement on the nuclear weapons the Soviet Union has placed on the Kola peninsula on the borders of Finland and Norway, an agreement covering the Baltic Sea area and agreements covering the rest of Europe. Lasse Budtz expanded on these demands:

"I think an agreement on the Baltic Sea area is the most important. It is meaningless to talk about a nuclear-free North that does not include the eastern countries bordering on the Baltic. And it would also be meaningless unless the Soviet Union agrees to remove the six missile-equipped submarines splashing around the Baltic Sea."

Then an agreement would also have to include the Kola peninsula?

"Here there is a special problem. Both tactical and strategic nuclear missiles are located on the Kola peninsula. It is conceivable that an agreement with the Soviet Union would be based on allowing them to retain the strategic arms but not the tactical ones aimed at Scandinavia.

"Finally, the Norwegians in particular have pointed out that a treaty for the Nordic region would also have to contain some rules for the rest of Europe, especially the countries lying closest to us. It would be expedient to include both East and West Germany in an agreement on the Nordic area. Otherwise such an agreement would be meaningless."

Then there is no sense in working for a nuclear-free North in isolation?

"No. I have referred to the Norwegian attitude here but by and large it is one that I share. I definitely do not regard it as realistic to revive Finnish President Kekkonen's old plan on an isolated nuclear-free North. And it would be impossible to achieve Nordic agreement on such an idea," said Lasse Budtz.

Reagan

When Kjeld Olesen, Anker Jorgensen and Lasse Budtz meet Willy Brandt today one of the topics of discussion will be a possible European initiative to get the new American President, Ronald Reagan, to start negotiations with the Soviet Union concerning the European medium-range missiles, e.g. a possible reduction of both the Soviet SS 20 missiles and the 572 Pershing 2 and cruise missiles NATO has decided to install.

But Lasse Budtz did not think a European Social Democratic initiative on new missile talks would come up right away.

"At the meeting in Amsterdam we made some evaluations of Reagan's policy and we will inform Willy Brandt of these evaluations since he is president of the Socialist International," Lasse Budtz said.

But a concrete political initiative on the missile question is not imminent?

"No, I'm quite sure of that. What we discussed was whether Reagan would pursue the policy he announced during his election campaign. It has happened before that American Presidents have said one thing and done another, you know. Nixon also pursued a different policy than the one he advocated," said Lasse Budtz.

6578

CSO: 8113/0752

## PROBLEMS, IMPORTANCE OF MERCHANT MARINE NOTED

Stuttgart MARINE-RUNDSCHAU in English Feb 81 pp 67-69

[Article by Dr Hans Juergen Stoecker, President of the German Shipowners Association]

[Text]

The present political scene in the world being characterized by a multitude of necessarily alarming conflicts and tendencies, confrontations among the various systems and basic concepts have again led to the use of force to an ever increasing degree. Detente efforts – their successes so far achieved as well as their prospects of success – are at stake. The world's economy is in a difficult phase of development and the energy problem, the supply of raw materials, the provision of funds to be made available where they are actually needed, inflation, the North-South differences, and the East-West trade are, apart from specific problems within many national economies, but part of an index typical of this phase. It coincides with a rapidly growing world population whose demands are increasing and with different desires and needs of mankind. Both the limits and implications of economic growth are no longer a purely academic subject.

Under such conditions the interlacings, interactions, and interdependencies of both world economies and world politics must, of necessity, augment. At least due to the consequences and implications involved more and more events will gain a global dimension beyond their local or regional significance. Economic measures used as a means of policy and political involvement or moves to maintain economic interests – though hardly definable in regard to their aims – determine both the actions and the attitudes of states. With the number of actors increasing the maintenance of sovereignty and the corresponding pursuance of own interests continue to dominate all events for the time being. This is also true for the multitude of international organizations, institutions, groupings, conventions or multilateral treaties. They mostly considered themselves to be mechanisms used by changing majorities to push their national aims through regardless of their being equal or similar and sometimes even if the opinion of the majority disagrees with a solution which would be in the interests of all countries concerned.

In this context it is certainly not necessary to demonstrate that mercantile shipping has always been in the very centre of the field of tension extending between politics and economy. The principles of the Flag Law, government interventions through planned cargo administration involving various manners and purposes are no more inventions of our days than the knowledge that a high geo-political and sea strategic value – and not only in the sense of «flag presence» with a nonpolitical symbol character – has always been attributed to mercantile shipping. Neither must I elaborate in view of the «Guiding Principles on Mercantile Shipping Policies» issued by the Federal Government in October 1972 on a national merchant fleet fulfilling an important function and partially contributing considerably to our economy within the scope of a national economy so strongly oriented toward foreign trade and commerce as that of the Federal Republic of Germany. Partial aspects, however, such as the easing contribution of a merchant fleet to the balance of performance in the field of foreign trade, the protection of its supply routes at sea in times of crisis or the benefits gained by German shipping companies from their participation in international sea transports deserve to be emphasized, not only because they were forgotten during the past period of an almost constant economic boom regarded, on the whole, as assured, but because both its political and economic weight has meant for years less than other motives in the light of the various aspects. Not only in regard to these aspects does a re-examination of the spectrum of opinions appear urgently necessary. The global political situation as well as the state of world-wide economic affairs and their future likewise exhort all persons concerned to listen to reason. Freedom in peace can hardly be guaranteed without détente efforts and without striving to overcome antagonisms by cooperation or non-interference into the affairs of others. In the struggle of the different systems, however, there is hardly any compromise. Détente as an objective in itself would politically and economically be equal to sacrifice: the objective to weaken, undermine and eventually destroy – even by economic means – our system in every way possible is immanent to the other system. The illusion that this situation could rapidly and decisively change has proved in the by-gone years to be exactly what it actually is.

The German merchant fleet has had a hard time and difficult years are still ahead. Though it tried to reach a higher level of productivity through high investment rates and rationalization measures as well as by exploiting all the skill of its managements and employees in every company and though both the Federal Government and the *Länder* (federal states) have been kindly giving assistance it could not be helped that heavy losses of substance and distinct structural changes occurred. They are a result of the international situation of the shipping trade, on the one hand, and of the specific position of German merchant shipping in the overall competition, on the other.

The fate of DDG »Hansa«, Bremen, and of the Schulte & Bruns shipping company, Emden/Bremen, also gives an example of many another enterprise which could only survive thanks to aids coming from both public and private economic sources. The necessity to cope with losses of revenues caused by the decline of rates and the dollar forced more and more companies to charter more and more ships sailing under foreign flags. On account of German regulations and tariffs not allowing for this they looked for, and found there, possibilities of cost adaptations, particularly in the field of personnel costs. Gains made by such units have often helped to improve the overall situation of an enterprise and will continue to do so.

The changes experienced by German shipping companies are considerable and of great concern to all persons responsible. The following survey justifies both statements:

In early 1981 the German merchant fleet travelling under the German flag and registered in German sea registers (without coastal vessels and fishing boats) comprised 560 units with a total of 8.33 mill. GRT. These figures involve 115 ships with 1.43 mill. GRT registered in German registers but showing for a certain time foreign flags in accordance with § 7 of the Flag Law. According to documents of the German Ship Owners' Association (Verband Deutscher Reeder) there are another 225 ships under foreign flags with 2.48 mill. GRT which belong to German shipping companies. For the time being a total of 340 ships (all of them with more than 1.000 GRT) with 3.91 mill. GRT out of an overall fleet of 785 units with 10.81 mill. GRT are sailing under foreign flags.

As for the sectors of employment, tankers have the lion's share measured in GRTs while tramp-shipping has the largest share as compared with the number of vessels employed. As to the value of the transport performance route shipping alone provides appr. one half of the total receipts.

The age structure of the German merchant fleet is favourable, 80 % of the vessels being younger than 10 years as compared with 1 % only older than 20 years.

The average age of the fleet being 7.1 and 7.4 years resp., either measured by tonnage or vessels, shows its modernity, demonstrating at the same time that it has constantly been adapted to the requirements of the market. To do so high investments were required. From 1950 through 1979 a total of 32 billion DM were invested,

about 20 billion DM from 1970 through 1979 alone. As seen from the point of view of the management the number of German shipping companies amounts to 80 for the time being. The number of seamen employed in German ships sailing under a German flag reaches 27.300, the rate of foreign crew members being 22 %. In ships sailing under foreign flags the majority of the leading employees are German nationals.

Until 1971 only 60 ships with 400 000 GRT were sailing under foreign flags, the number of shipping companies using exclusively ships under the German flag having decreased from 69 (in 1974) to 40 (in 1980). At the same time the number of companies employing mostly vessels under a foreign flag increased from 9 to 20. 19 companies – as compared with 6 in 1974 – are exclusively employing vessels under foreign flags for the time being.

I do not intend to elaborate at this point on details of what has to be done. The quintessence of the »Guiding Principles on Mercantile Shipping Policies« issued by the Federal Government in October 1972 according to which »the Federal Republic of Germany relying on comprehensive foreign trade needs a first-rate and efficient merchant fleet privately operated by economically sound companies« represents both a good basis and a starting-point. At the same

time it contains a clear-cut answer to those who expect great benefit from a nationalization of the German shipping companies. Yet it still remains to be emphasized that what will come out of the necessary discussions on measures to be taken must be developed with all the determination with which three decades ago we embarked on the re-organization of the German merchant fleet after World War II, solving all problems in a common effort. The changes in the political and economic global environment let us hope that in a democracy ready to defend its rights such as the Federal Republic of Germany this determination will not only prompt us to make decisions but also to act accordingly. Biassed, false, and simply ideologically tinged Rabelaisian tactics and polemics help only those who do not want German shipping to have an encouraging future. An encouraging future is a future which protects free enterprise economy against encroachments and limitations from the exterior and strengthens and improves it to face strains in the interior, but it is also a future in which free enterprise remains a risk and achievements pay.

CSO: 3120

## MOGENS CAMRE NAMED SDP POLITICAL SPOKESMAN

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 28 Jan 81 p 2

[Article: "New Spokesman Temperamental, Creative"]

[Text] The man now taking over as the new political spokesman for the Social Democratic Party is used to being the subject of much public comment. But not all the comment has been favorable. Political scientist Mogens Camre, 44, who has been budget spokesman for his party will now handle political issues as well.

It is typical of Mogens Camre that he had to go through a ballot fight to get the post as spokesman for the Social Democratic parliamentary group. He is regarded as belonging to the right wing of the party and he has had to fight his way into increasingly important posts handicapped by his temperament and a habit of making remarks that are often ill-considered. On the other hand his industry and his knowledge are much respected in the group.

Mogens Camre has been a member of Folketing since 1969 and he is elected from the Western Metropolitan District which is currently causing sparks to fly in the ranks of Social Democratic candidates due to the candidacy of actress Helle Virkner. The fight for parliamentary representation from this metropolitan district will be hard and a position as political spokesman may give Mogens Camre a better chance than he otherwise would have had.

Mogens Camre is carrying some unsavory private items in his political baggage. They involve a violent dispute with neighbors and a fine for having taken a pistol along in his suitcase on a trip from Oslo to Copenhagen without a permit. Many other things have brought Mogens Camre into the spotlight on the purely political level. This includes great creativity in the savings sector, not always popular among party comrades, with regard to such things as medicine and the Faro bridge. He has also sent a number of protests and objections to the chairman of the Radio Council concerning poor coverage of political events or insufficient respect for politicians.

## Hard Selection Fights in Social Democratic Group

Both the new Social Democratic political spokesman and a new member of the group committee had to go through hard balloting yesterday within the Social

Democratic parliamentary group before winning their posts. Budget spokesman Mogens Camre will now act as the party's political spokesman as well, thus also assuming an important post on the LO [Danish Federation of Trade Unions] executive committee at the same time. Mogens Camre succeeds Justice Minister Ole Espersen.

The chairman of the Danish Officials' Union, Hans Jorgen Jensen, lost the vote on the spokesman post to Mogens Camre by 26 to Camre's 37 votes. But Hans Jorgen Jensen did win a ballot vote for the post of new group committee member to succeed Greenland and Church Affairs Minister Tove Lindbo Larsen against five other candidates. He received 21 votes, Svend Andersen received 14, Christian Kelm-Hansen received 10, Knud Damgaard received 8, Winnie Moller received 7 and Kristian Albertsen received 4.

The Social Democratic parliamentary group recommended Svend Andersen to become the new chairman of the Folketing Business Committee instead of Greenland and Church Affairs Minister Tove Lindbo Larsen.

Social Democratic group secretary J. K. Hansen was named to head the group's new press and information section. This section will replace the old press and information service for the Folketing group. The old service was called SNT, Social Democratic News Service.

6578

CSO: 8113/0753

## KARJALAINEN DISCUSSES FEUD WITH KEKKONEN, PRESIDENTIAL RACE

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 24 Jan 81 p 7

[Report on interview by Eric Appel with Ahti Karjalainen, chairman of the Finnish-Soviet Commission on Economic Cooperation; date and place not given]

[Text] "Mikko Pohtola doesn't know what he is talking about. It is rubbish to say that the 'neutrality clause' in the communique covering my 1971 visit to the Soviet Union as prime minister was reworded without the president's knowledge." So says bank director Ahti Karjalainen, whose relations with President Kekkonen and the Communists and whose position in the so-called presidential game have recently been much debated.

"If Pohtola (SUOMEN KIVALENTI's chief editor, who claimed recently that Karjalainen's relations with Ekudden have gone awry partly because of the above-mentioned reformulation, which he characterized by saying that Karjalainen "passed Kekkonen on the left") had taken the trouble to find out how such communiqués are produced, he would have realized that it is simply impossible to ignore the president in such a matter."

Communiqués are prepared far in advance and are always drawn up in consultation with and under the direction of the president of the republic. In this case, it was Risto Hyvarinen, then head of the Political Department, who conducted the discussions concerning the communique.

## Confirmation by Hyvarinen

Risto Hyvarinen is currently our ambassador to New Delhi. He told HUFVUDSTADSBLADET that it was indeed as Karjalainen says.

He said, "The communique was largely complete when the visit began. There had been discussion with the Russians for 2 or 3 months concerning the communique and, among other things, the neutrality wording, which was already complete when the prime minister arrived in Moscow."

He also explained that it is completely impossible for such a communique to come about in any manner without the president's knowledge.

That the president was kept informed the entire time of what was going on is also clear from the telex calls.

Ambassador Hyvarinen declined to express an opinion or even hazard a guess as to why the Soviet Union wanted the rewording.

Ahti Karjalainen is a little more frank on that point.

"Of course, the reason is known only to the Russians themselves for sure, but we can guess that they wanted the text of the communique to be more in line with the preamble to the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance.

"But it can also be recalled that in the 1960's, there were some among us who wanted to interpret the concept of neutrality in a way that did not really fit the facts."

They discussed our neutrality and that of Switzerland in the same breath, without remembering that our neutrality has its special characteristics, just as Sweden's does, for example.

Ours, of course, has the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance as its basis and starting point, and because of that it differs from Swiss neutrality.

"That was a point that I, for one, felt led to draw attention to at the time.

"One can imagine that that very discussion in Finland played some part in the Soviet desire to produce a wording which would, so to speak, restore order and provide a clearer statement as to where the boundaries of neutrality lie."

#### New Generation in Soviet Union

Foreign policy and economic policy are Karjalainen's special field. People know him as one of the outwardly more discreet of our foreign ministers and foreign trade ministers (that should presumably be counted a virtue in a foreign minister). He has been minister of foreign affairs three times, prime minister twice, second minister of finance twice, minister of commerce and industry once, and minister of economy and the Cabinet Office once.

Since 1967 he has been chairman of the permanent Finnish-Soviet Commission on Economic Cooperation, through which all major agreements and important decisions concerning our economic relations with the Soviet Union are channeled.

Today it is trite to say that our foreign policy rests on a stable foundation and that our good relations with the East do not hinder good relations with the West or prevent us from having friendly relations with China, for example.

But taking the long view, isn't there anything on the horizon that might indicate the possibility of a reversal in that situation?

Karjalainen answers, "Not really. Although, of course, it will be in our interest to be attentive to the changes that will eventually bring a new generation into the Soviet leadership and to what that will mean."

Karjalainen bore witness to our good relations with the East. They are based in particular on his many years as chairman of the economic commission, on which N. S. Patolichev, Soviet minister of foreign trade, sits as chief negotiator for the Soviet side.

It is those two--Karjalainen and Patolichev--who represent continuity on the commission, whose other members have been changed quite frequently.

#### Benefit of Trade With the East

The commission came about on Finland's initiative to create a sort of counterpart to the centralized system in the Soviet Union.

Our entire business community is represented on the commission. The commission has obviously been of great benefit.

Karjalainen points out that trade with the East is of great importance to us, since for one thing it sustains employment through its character of reciprocal--bilateral--trade.

Our bill for petroleum is currently rising sharply, of course. Since we must offset that by producing and exporting more, one might ask whether our resources are adequate for maintaining sufficiently high exports to the West, where we are also heavily dependent on imports.

Karjalainen answers, "The petroleum bill is a problem, of course, but it does not represent only Soviet oil--it also includes Western oil. Actually, the share of Soviet trade is about where our trade with the West was in the 1950's, using comparable figures. So there is hardly any danger to our trade with the West."

The Soviet Union is, as it should be, our foremost trading partner, and Sweden is in second place, which is natural. Because both are our neighbors. The metalworking industry has benefited especially from trade with the Soviet Union, but in recent years the consumer goods industry has also begun to find its feet. Clothing, furniture, and even farm products are being exported.

And then, we also have project cooperation with Kostamus and Svetogorsk, which are the important projects. Talks are also now underway concerning projects such as expansion of the port of Tallinn and a transportation yard outside Leningrad.

#### Social Democrats in; Conservatives out

Over the years, chairmanship of the commission has provided good personal contacts not only in the Soviet Union but also with our business community. And with some of the Conservative Party's prominent members.

Why has the Conservative Party been sidelined in the makeup of the government? Is there any basis for the talk about unreliability in foreign policy--the so-called "general grounds"?

"The basic reason is that the Social Democrats came back in 1966 following their long period of 'wandering in the wilderness' on account of foreign policy. There was an old tradition of cooperation between the Center Party and the Social Democrats, and it was later extended to include the People's Democrats."

The Conservative Party, which previously had been needed for the majority governments, was no longer needed and was thrown out.

## People's Front, Minority Government, or New Elections

But of course, the Conservative Party also has the encumbrance of people who do not sincerely support our foreign policy line and even some who openly criticize it or repudiate it.

But there is nothing really to prevent the Conservative Party from being a coalition party if a few other parties want to cooperate with it.

Karjalainen says, "It's just that I don't see any possibility for a majority government other than with the current coalition. The Conservative Party and the parties in the center together do not make a majority, and if they formed a minority government they would have considerable difficulty in Parliament.

"So it would be better to have a minority government made up of parties in the center, or even new elections, if the current government coalition were to break up."

It is certainly true that the government has a low profile. But the economic situation does not encourage any major buildup of that profile, either. And neither do we need any more major reforms. We have most of them behind us.

"For that matter, this government could scarcely stand a higher profile. It could easily break up if someone began to carry on too much."

## "Gray Eminence"

Karjalainen says he has never been an ardent party politician. It is true that he sits on the Center Party's Party Board and its steering committee. But party politics do not really interest him.

Despite that, he took part in bringing about Sukselainen's fall and raising Virolainen to the throne, and then in bringing about Virolainen's fall and raising Vayrynen to the throne.

In other words, he is what is known as a "gray eminence." Does he have his own "gang" within the party, as Virolainen gives one to understand?

"No," he answers, "I don't have. Friends I do have, of course. I have tried to avoid becoming unnecessarily involved in internal 'juntas.' But the party leadership needs to be rejuvenated; the party needs to be given a new image occasionally. That includes everyone, even me," he says.

Should this be interpreted to mean that Karjalainen, the "presidential candidate" that everyone is talking about, is no longer interested, or perhaps never has been?

Fed up

On that point Karjalainen is silent. He is beginning to be fed up with the presidential debate, and perhaps that is understandable. For almost 20 years he has figured in those discussions in one way or another.

"The Center Party has officially decided that as long as Urho Kekkonen remains available, there will be absolutely no discussion about a possible successor.

"It has only been 2 years since Urho Kekkonen was reelected. The whole debate must therefore be felt as irritating and annoying by the current president.

"I could certainly understand it if the president felt offended by all the Gallup polls and all the hullabaloo about the 1984 election and who is going to succeed him."

He is not letting himself be worried by the latest move by the Social Democrats and Aarne Saarinen, boss of the PKP (Finnish Communist Party). What Saarinen really means and what he did or did not say have never been really clear when it comes to his attitude toward Karjalainen.

#### People's Front Candidate not Absolutely Necessary

On the other hand, Saarinen has definitely been looking for a joint candidate for the People's Front.

Karjalainen has a few reservations concerning that idea in such a categorical form.

Personal qualifications and foreign policy are considerably more important factors. He says that the People's Front does not need to have any greater importance than other political groups in this matter.

Concerning his relations with the Communists, he observed that they are straightforward. Communists are just as good people as, for example, the Conservatives and others.

"I have tried to avoid getting involved in the party's internal conflicts. Attempts have been made to draw me into them, but I have avoided it."

Regardless of how topical the issue of the presidential election may be, Karjalainen does not want to say more than what appears here. So we cannot tell you whether or not he has his sights set on the office of president, or whether he is willing to make himself available if someone asks him to.

But at this stage, of course, no one else wants to either. But as long as no one is saying anything, Karjalainen will probably continue to find himself a subject of speculation, whether he likes it or not.

11798

CSO: 3109

## CP'S AALTO THREATENS TO PULL SKDL FROM COALITION

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 31 Jan 81 p 7

[Report on interview by Stefan Lundberg with Minister of Labor Arvo Aalto; date and place not given]

[Text] "If the government has really resigned itself to the unemployment problem, I am going to recommend that we pull out of the coalition government," says Minister of Labor Arvo Aalto, who in an interview with HUFVUDSTADSBLADET also accused the FFC [Confederation of Finnish Trade Unions] of being spineless on employment issues.

"The atmosphere in this country is very bad just now. The attitude toward employment has turned negative in a situation in which we have over 100,000 jobless," says Aalto.

"This is a society for those who are doing all right; it is definitely not for those who are unemployed.

"This government's most important task was to do something about unemployment. And we have succeeded in doing plenty, but now the attitude has changed, if not in theory than at least in practice. The government has resigned itself to the problem. Unemployment is seen as something natural."

## Aalto Flares up

It was primarily the criticism directed at the new bill for amending the employment law that caused the sometimes highly temperamental Aalto to flare up.

Its critics--and they include a number of ministers--claim that the Ministry of Labor is power hungry and wants to interfere with the doings of other ministries.

According to the bill, which was submitted to Parliament yesterday, the Ministry of Labor will be able to feed employment funds into the projects of other ministries in order to promote employment.

Is it a matter of being power hungry?

"That has nothing to do with the matter!

"The intention has never been that we would usurp more power. The whole issue surrounding this law is a typical example of the political level in this country!

"The critics refer to an old law requiring that separate funds be allocated for construction activity at central vocational schools. That means that we would not be able to use employment funds for that purpose."

#### Refuse the Money?

"Now it happens that there are dozens of such laws. If we interpret them the same way, it means that we cannot use employment funds for important projects--which they are, since they are included in the budget--but instead, we must search high and low for unimportant projects to finance with employment funds," says Aalto indignantly.

"How in the world can they think that we are encroaching on other ministries when we feed more money into their own projects? Are they going to refuse the money?"

"No one claims that the Ministry of Labor really has much more power because we control money belonging to other ministries--by determining how it shall be used for employment--and that involves a lot more money and power, while this is only a drop in the bucket."

#### Invited to Lunch

(At the press conference called to announce that the government had released the new bill--right after the HUFVUDSTADSBLADET interview--a reporter asked why there has been so much hullabaloo about the bill.

Aalto spread his arms and said, "I'll take you out to a good lunch if you can explain how Finnish politics can produce such an uproar.")

So that is the background explaining why Arvo Aalto is now losing his patience with the government coalition.

How big a part does the issue play in the Communist threat to withdraw from the coalition?

"I believe it comes as a surprise to them. But the mood within the government is now such that they absolutely want to cut back all expenditures, even though the trade balance is better now than it was at the start of the 1970's, and even though the tax policy has enabled us to achieve overall tax results that are 3 percentage points above the goal set by the government in 1977.

"If such reasoning is accepted, there is no possibility of an active employment policy."

[Question] "You have been demanding a tougher struggle. How did you intend to set the machinery in motion?"

[Answer] "That is a question that is not resolved by magic. Naturally, the employment policy must be carried out primarily through economic policy in the government and in connection with agreements on incomes.

"But even if those sectors were managed better than they are now, we would not get far."

## Take Away From the Richest

"There is only one possibility for really doing something; income distribution. But in our society, are we prepared to redistribute the highest incomes--the amounts earned by the highest paid 20 percent?"

"Are we prepared for the reorganizations of working hours that directly affect employment?"

FFC: by the Scruff of the Neck

[Question] "How has the labor movement conducted itself? You have not been especially pleased with the FFC either, have you?"

[Answer] "The FFC and the entire labor movement should be grabbed by the scruff of the neck. Try for yourself to find a word about employment in the FFC's program. The employee organizations exist for those who have a job, not for the unemployed. Unfortunately, that is the way it is."

[Question] "Voices have been raised saying that the FKP [Finnish Communist Party] and the Dfff [Finnish People's Democratic League] ought to wake up and create a clearer profile for themselves. Does that mean a step to the left?"

[Answer] "Creating a clearer profile is always a question of how we can work more effectively for the cause of this people and this nation."

"That does not mean swimming against the tide and making angry statements, but it does mean responsible and effective influence to achieve the stated goals."

Including being a part of the government coalition?

"Yes, that, too, if the conditions exist, but right now I feel that we are getting into seven fathoms of water."

11798

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## FINANCE MINISTER: LITTLE ROOM FOR STIMULATION, INITIATIVES

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 28 Jan 81 p 1

[Text] "We are not going to get through the international recession with nothing more than a scare this time." So said Minister of Finance Ahti Pekkala as the report on the national economy for 1980 was being presented on Tuesday. The deficit in the Finnish trade balance rose to 5.4 billion markkaa last year, and the situation is scarcely going to improve this year.

The deficit in national finance grew during the good years of 1979 and 1980, and this means that the government's possibilities for adopting stimulation measures are limited.

The result is that employment, as one example, is going to depend to a large extent on private firms and on the competitiveness of Finnish industry. The government's means of intervention are limited to monetary policy and to the possible liquidation of funds consisting of export and equalization deposits, investment reserves, and cash reserve deposits.

According to Minister of Finance Pekkala, the government will soon take up for discussion the question of the special deposits.

Finland's gross national product rose by 5.5 percent last year--a record high in a year that was poor internationally. The big deficit in the trade balance is due in part to the fact that import prices, especially petroleum prices, rose faster than export prices, and also to the fact that imports increased in volume.

The employment situation improved considerably last year, although 5 percent of the available labor force was still unemployed at the end of last year. This was because the labor supply increased by 40,000, while the number of new jobs last year totaled 70,000.

More news on last year's economic results and the prospects for the future appears in today's Business Section.

11798  
CSO: 3109

## INTERIOR MINISTRY DEFENDS POLICY ON EAST BLOC DEFECTORS

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 3 Feb 81 p 5

[Text] Illegal border crossings--including those along the eastern border--are dealt with in complete conformity with the so-called international refugee agreement. If asylum is requested, the request is handled in due form by the Ministry of Interior.

Defectors are not sent back immediately. Instead, each illegal border crossing is handled individually on the basis of ascertained facts.

That was made clear in the Ministry of Interior's statement on border and other security matters, which was presented in the minister's reception room on Monday. But HUFVUDSTADSBLADET learned that defectors from the East do not seek asylum in our country. They are on their way farther west. And in such cases, therefore, the question of asylum does not come up.

## Handling of Defectors: a Controversial Question

Our legislation concerning foreigners is in the process of being amended. A bill is now on the verge of completion. Agreement on its wording has been reached among all the government parties with the exception of the Communists.

Minister Arvo Aalto explains, "The disagreement revolves mainly around the rules for handling defectors." He says, "In recent years this has aroused a great deal of justified criticism."

He has not yet seen the latest version of the bill, so he cannot say whether its wording satisfies the Communists or not.

The Ministry of Interior has published a brief guide to its statement with reference to the aspect of security, among other things.

One of the things it notes is that private citizens can also be bound to secrecy by the police if they have information that could harm the country economically or endanger security if it fell into the hands of a foreign power.

On those grounds, the police can also prohibit such persons from revealing what they know to newspapers and the broadcast media.

## Police Records

The records kept by the Security Police and access to those records also came up in the discussion. Almost a year ago, the Security Police refused to allow a researcher access to information on its predecessor on the grounds that there was a shortage of space and personnel.

Incidentally, that refusal by the Security Police was upheld by the Supreme Administrative Court.

Police Division Head Tiitinen gave assurances, however, that no ill will was involved. It is simply that both space and manpower are needed to separate public documents from those that have not yet been declared public.

The problem is in the process of being straightened out now. Documents over 25 years old--and therefore public--are to be separated from the rest and sent to the National Archives.

The head of the Police Division feels, however, that in some cases--where it is a question of problems involving security policy and documents which might harm private individuals if made public--the minister should decide whether to extend the period of secrecy to 40 years.

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## CONTINUED FAVORABLE BALANCE IN BORDER TRADE WITH USSR

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 28 Jan 81 p 13

[Text] (FNB)--The border trade between the Soviet Union and Finland based on the exchange of goods developed favorably last year. According to data from the License Office, the value of trade totaled 73.7 million rubles (about 425 million markkaa), an increase of 24.5 percent over 1979.

The increase was partly quantitative and is based partly on a greater supply of commodities. The new Finnish exports were represented by leather clothing, among other items, while new imports consisted of building materials, chemical products, and other goods.

Textiles constituted 51 percent of last year's exports, but the relative share of textile exports fell by 6 percent. Metals made up 20 percent of the total exports, while wood and paper products accounted for 10 percent of last year's exports.

The most important imported product was raw timber (40 percent of our imports from the Soviet Union). Next in line were textile goods (15 percent) and food products (12 percent). Border trade was begun in 1958, and in the first year its total value was about 4.6 million markkaa. Trade increased steadily until 1966, when it declined by about 15 percent due to lower Finnish exports of defective lumber. In 1977 Finland's imports fell by 21 percent due to the difficulties being experienced by the Finnish woodworking industry. Those difficulties resulted in lower imports of Soviet raw timber.

The Regional Development Fund calculates that the value of border trade will total about 600 million markkaa this year. Firms in the development zones are estimated to account for 100 million markkaa worth of that trade.

Eino Petajaniemi, director of the Regional Development Fund, says that border trade is of great importance to firms in the development zones, and he hopes that those firms will be able to increase their exports to the Soviet Union. To that end, the fund intends to pay close attention to improving participation in border trade by the firms in the development zones.

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CSO: 3109

## LATEST IFOP POLL SHOWS CHIRAC GAIN

Paris LE POINT in French 16-22 Feb 81 pp 44-49

[Article by Prof. Jean Charlot of the Paris institute for political studies:  
"The Big Shots Lay Down the Law"]

[Text] In this eight IFOP [French Public Opinion Institute]-LE POINT presidential poll, Giscard, Mitterrand and Chirac can find reasons for hope. But Debre is cracking, and Marchais finds himself below the 15-percent level in voting intentions.

Debre tumble, setback for Giscard and Marchais, very slight progress for Mitterrand and first successes of Chirac's offensive--the eighth IFOP-LE POINT opinion poll is all the richer in information since additional questions have revealed ferments for change which could lead equally to a deterioration in Giscard's position or to its stabilization and even improvement.

Jacques Chirac's candidacy was announced only at the final stage of this eighth opinion poll. It nonetheless immediately affected the situation in two ways by considerably increasing the number of people intending to vote for Jacques Chirac (11 percent compared with 8 percent) and by reducing Michel Debre's chances by a similar percentage (from 7.5 percent to 4.5 percent) in the event that both men are candidates in the first ballot.

In any event, Michel Debre has retreated on all fronts. Fewer people believe in his chances of winning. After being outclassed by Giscard and Chirac as the "best majority candidate," he has now been overtaken by Chaban even though the latter is not a candidate. His prestige has suffered--only 35 percent of the French people believe that he possesses the necessary qualities to become president compared with 41 percent in December 1980. Finally, slightly fewer people are prepared to vote for him now than initially (4.5 percent compared with 5 percent in August 1980). On the other hand, Chirac has improved his image (even overtaking Mitterrand, but not Giscard, with respect to qualities a president should possess). He has improved his credibility and started the reconquest of the Gaullist electorate, maybe in expectation of even better things to come.

The situation is gradually becoming clearer. The "Coluche phenomenon" seems to be continuing and the "small candidates"--many of whom could well be unable to qualify for lack of a sufficient number of "sponsors" (at least 500 sponsors from 30 departments are needed)--are beginning to give way to the four big names. The total percentage of people intending to vote for Giscard, Mitterrand, Marchais and Chirac has increased from 78 percent to 79.5 percent in the past 3 months.

In a way, the majority is starting from positions which it secured in 1974. The situation has been remarkably stable--the number of people intending to vote for Giscard has gradually decreased to the level of the first ballot in 1974, namely 33 percent. In 1974, Chaban and Royer obtained 17.7 percent of votes cast whereas 17.5 percent of the electorate now apparently intend to vote for Chirac, Debre and Marie-France Garaud.

As for the left, with 40.5 percent of the electorate intending to vote for its candidates, it is in a considerably worse situation than it was in 1974 when it secured 46.1 percent of votes in the first ballot. However, this gap is not a result of any progress by the majority--it can mainly be explained by the (temporary?) rise of ecologist votes (5-6 percent compared with 2 percent in 1974). Pressure for "tactical" voting should enable Mitterrand, who has progressed slightly, to pin some hope on this.

The Communist electorate seems to wish to break through its reserve in the second ballot. At the time of the preceding opinion poll, only 36 percent of Communists intended to vote for Francois Mitterrand in the second ballot, whereas 40 percent adopted a wait-and-see attitude. The corresponding figures are now 61 percent and 35 percent.... Everything seems to indicate that, as a result of his noisy campaign, Georges Marchais has lost rather than gained support. The percentage of people intending to vote for him in the first ballot amounting to 14-14.5 percent according to different hypotheses, compared with 15 percent in January 1981.

Even though the change in the electorate's voting intentions and its hopes for the individual candidates' victory is unfavorable to the outgoing president, his chances in the second ballot remain the highest. And, above all, his image, which greatly deteriorated at the end of the year, seems to have improved. Giscard remains by far "the least unlikeable" candidate. The ecologist electorate's attitude to him is more favorable now than it was at the time of preceding opinion polls. The unity of the majority electorate seems exemplary compared with a still far from perfect transfer of votes among the electorate of the left. Despite his advantages--especially in the social sphere--Mitterrand carries round his neck the electoral millstone of Communist ministers which everybody attributes to him. As for Chirac, even though his chances have improved, he lacks credibility compared with Giscard and--unlike the outgoing president--gives rise to serious rejection reactions on the left.

All in all, this opinion poll could make it possible to envisage a stabilization rather favorable to Giscard's position if the Friday IFOP-FRANCE SOIR opinion poll did not indicate that his popularity in the country is continuing to decrease--37 percent of the French people remain pleased with Giscard as president but the proportion of people displeased with him has increased from 47 to 51 percent in 1 month. As for Premier Raymond Barre, his--temporary?--silence has not worked in his favor either--only 25 percent (compared with 27 percent) of the French people are pleased with him whereas 63 percent (compared with 57 percent) say that they are displeased.... Eighty days before the election, the head of state and the premier have again broken all records of unpopularity compared with their own past performance and that of their predecessors.

#### 1. The Majority: VGE [Valery Giscard d'Estaing] Still the Leader

In your opinion, who is the candidate that can best lead the majority to victory in the second round of the presidential election?

|                      |     | <u>Jan 81</u> | <u>Sep 80</u> |
|----------------------|-----|---------------|---------------|
| V. Giscard d'Estaing | 62% | 61%           | 66%           |
| Jacques Chirac       | 15% | 15%           | 14%           |
| Michel Debre         | 6%  | 9%            | 6%            |
| no opinion           | 17% | 15%           | 14%           |

Giscard remains by far the best candidate of the majority in the eyes, of course, of course, of 77 percent of the UDF [French Democratic Union] voters, but also for 60 percent of the RPR [Rally for the Republic] voters (+8 points in 1 month) and likewise for the socialist and communist electorate.

And in your opinion, who is the candidate that can best lead the majority in the second round of the presidential election on the assumption that Valery Giscard d'Estaing is not a candidate?

|                  |     | <u>Jan 81</u> | <u>Sep 80</u> |
|------------------|-----|---------------|---------------|
| Jacques Chirac   | 41% | 37%           | 39%           |
| J. Chaban-Delmas | 14% | 14%           | 15%           |
| Michel Debre     | 13% | 19%           | 12%           |
| Raymond Barre    | 9%  | 7%            | 10%           |
| no opinion       | 23% | 23%           | 24%           |

If Giscard were not a candidate, Chirac comes forward as the majority's best presidential asset. Michel Debre loses 6 points in 1 month and becomes less credible than Chaban-Delmas.

## 2. The Opposition: Mitterrand Confirmed

And who is the candidate that can best lead the opposition to victory in the second round of the presidential election?

|                     |     | <u>Jan 81</u> | <u>Sep 80</u> |
|---------------------|-----|---------------|---------------|
| Francois Mitterrand | 73% | 72%           | 30%           |
| Georges Marchais    | 12% | 12%           | 11%           |
| no opinion          | 15% | 16%           | 16%           |

Since the elimination of Rocard, Mitterrand has become the undisputed champion of the left. We point out that in September 1980, for example, Michel Rocard, who at that time figured in the poll, obtained 43 percent of voting intentions as against 30 percent for Mitterrand.

## 3. Presidential Qualities: Chirac's Breakthrough


For each of the following personalities, tell me whether, in your opinion, he has or does not have the personal qualities necessary for being president of the republic one day.

|                          |     | <u>Has them</u> |               | <u>Does not have them</u> |               |     |
|--------------------------|-----|-----------------|---------------|---------------------------|---------------|-----|
|                          |     | <u>Jan 81</u>   | <u>Sep 80</u> | <u>Jan 81</u>             | <u>Sep 80</u> |     |
| Valery Giscard d'Estaing | 73% | 69%             | 76%           | 14%                       | 21%           | 14% |
| Jacques Chirac           | 58% | 50%             | 55%           | 25%                       | 33%           | 31% |
| Francois Mitterrand      | 57% | 53%             | 48%           | 28%                       | 33%           | 39% |
| Michel Debre             | 35% | 41%             | 32%           | 42%                       | 40%           | 48% |
| Georges Marchais         | 18% | 19%             | 18%           | 67%                       | 68%           | 71% |

A breakthrough for Chirac--who passes Mitterrand--while Debre's presidential image becomes negative. The RPR voters seems less tempted than in the last poll by denigration of the president in office (91 percent think he has the qualities of a president, as against 73 percent in December 1980). Giscard, Chirac and Mitterrand are the only candidates who have presidential stature in the minds of most of the French.


## 4. The Stars of the Month: Mitterrand-Marchais

For each of the following political personalities, tell me whether, in the course of recent weeks, he has rather increased his chances of winning the next presidential election or has rather decreased them.



5. VGE: Negative balance, but...

If you had to draw up today an overall balance sheet for Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's action as president of the republic since 1974, would you say that it is...



Key: 1. A rather positive balance 2. A rather negative balance

NB--The percentage of those with no opinion has varied only slightly: between 17 percent and 22 percent.

The overall balance-sheet for the 7-year term has been perceived as negative since last November; but February's judgment is a little less severe than that of January

1981, because of a certain recovery of the president's image among the RPR electorate, for whom it had, to be sure, deteriorated seriously at the end of last year. This favorable trend for Giscard among Gaullist voters is found also, to a lesser degree, among the other voter groups, including those of the opposition.

#### 6. Whom Do You Want for President?

On the whole, whom would you personally like to see as president of the republic in 1981? (No names were suggested to the respondents; their answers are spontaneous.)

|                          |     | <u>Jan 81</u> | <u>Sep 80</u> |
|--------------------------|-----|---------------|---------------|
| Valery Giscard d'Estaing | 28% | 29%           | 31%           |
| Francois Mitterrand      | 19% | 17%           | 11%           |
| Jacques Chirac           | 10% | 8%            | 7%            |
| Georges Marchais         | 9%  | 8%            | 8%            |
| Michel Debre             | 4%  | 5%            | 3%            |
| An ecologist candidate   | 1%  | 1%            | 1%            |
| no opinion               | 22% | 22%           | 22%           |

In this latest poll, the other personalities receive less than 1 percent.

#### ...and in Case of a Duel?

And if, on 10 May 1981, the date of the second round of the presidential election, Valery Giscard d'Estaing and Francois Mitterrand are running against one another, whom would you like to see win?

|                          |     |
|--------------------------|-----|
| Valery Giscard d'Estaing | 45% |
| Francois Mitterrand      | 39% |
| no opinion               | 16% |

A rise for Chirac (+2) and for Mitterrand (+2), a slight increase for Marchais (+1) --thanks to the Communist electorate--and a dropoff for Giscard and Debre. A Chirac victory is desired by 35 percent of the RPR voters; 36 percent prefer Giscard, and 15 percent Debre. This is Chirac's best result since the beginning of our polls.

In the event of a Giscard-Mitterrand duel in the second round, Giscard is clearly ahead. In terms of votes actually cast (that is, not taking into account the persons with no opinion), the balance of preferences is not different from that of second-round voting intentions (53 percent Giscard, 47 percent Mitterrand). We note, though, that there are more socialist voters (19 percent) and even communist voters (15 percent) choosing VGE than RPR voters (13 percent) and UDF voters (7 percent) preferring Mitterrand.

#### 7. VGE Still the Big Favorite

And who, in your opinion, will be elected president of the republic in May 1981? (No names were suggested to the respondents; their answers are spontaneous.)

|                      |     | Jan 81 |
|----------------------|-----|--------|
| V. Giscard d'Estaing | 55% | 60%    |
| Francois Mitterrand  | 12% | 8%     |
| Jacques Chirac       | 3%  | 2%     |
| Michel Debre         | 0%  | 1%     |
| Georges Marchais     | 1%  | 1%     |
| other personalities  | 0%  | 1%     |
| no opinion           | 29% | 27%    |

Giscard remains, among all voter groups, the big favorite over Mitterrand, the outsider of the left. Nevertheless, he loses 5 points in a month, while Francois Mitterrand gains 4.

### 8. Prize List for Antipathy

One may feel sympathy with or antipathy for politicians. Here are the names of five candidates in the presidential election. Tell me who, on this list, is the one you like the least, who is most antipathetic to you. And next after that one.

Cited as most antipathetic by the voters of:

| PC             | PS (Socialist Party) | UDF            | RPR            | Overall        |
|----------------|----------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| Chirac 43%     | Marchais 36%         | Marchais 70%   | Marchais 65%   | Marchais 43%   |
| VGE 18%        | Chirac 25%           | Mitterrand 14% | Mitterrand 15% | Chirac 16%     |
| Debre 17%      | Debre 14%            | Chirac 5%      | Debre 4%       | Debre 8%       |
| Mitterrand 5%  | VGE 12%              | VGE 3%         | Chirac 3%      | Mitter-        |
| Marchais 4%    | Mitterrand 2%        | Debre 2%       | VGE 2%         | rand 8%        |
| Don't know 13% | Don't know 11%       | Don't know 6%  | Don't know 11% | VGE 7%         |
|                |                      |                |                | Don't know 18% |

Cited as second most antipathetic, by the voters of:

| PC             | PS            | UDF            | RPR            | Overall        |
|----------------|---------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| Debre 31%      | Debre 25%     | Mitterrand 37% | Mitterrand 40% | Mitterrand 22% |
| VGE 28%        | Chirac 21%    | Chirac 17%     | Marchais 17%   | Debre 17%      |
| Chirac 12%     | VGE 13%       | Debre 16%      | Debre 10%      | Chirac 13%     |
| Mitterrand 5%  | Marchais 12%  | Marchais 15%   | VGE 9%         | Marchais 10%   |
| Marchais 3%    | Mitterrand 8% | VGE 1%         | Chirac 7%      | VGE 9%         |
| Don't know 21% | 21%           | Don't know 14% | Don't know 17% | Don't know 29% |

This question appeals to emotional feeling more than to reasoning. From it, one notes that the RPR and UDF electorates react practically in the same way: the No 1 adversary is Georges Marchais; next, very far behind, comes Mitterrand. On the other hand, the PS electorate designates as "most antipathetic" not a man of the majority but the leader of the PC, while the communist voters designate Chirac as enemy No 1. It should be noted that VGE, despite all the attacks on him, is the one who arouses the least antipathy.

## 9. VGE-Mitterrand: to Each His Strong Points

For each of the following areas, who, in your opinion--Valery Giscard d'Estaing or Francois Mitterrand--can do the most and best if he is elected president of the republic?

|                                 | <u>VGE</u> | <u>Mitterrand</u> | <u>No Opinion</u> |
|---------------------------------|------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| employment                      | 21%        | 44%               | 35%               |
| price rises and inflation       | 26%        | 32%               | 42%               |
| France's influence in the world | 61%        | 16%               | 33%               |
| social justice                  | 32%        | 42%               | 36%               |
| freedom of information          | 27%        | 27%               | 46%               |
| the solidity of the franc       | 46%        | 14%               | 42%               |
| national defense                | 45%        | 14%               | 41%               |
| political stability             | 44%        | 15%               | 41%               |
| individual liberties            | 33%        | 31%               | 36%               |

France's influence in the world, national defense, solidity of the franc and political stability: these are Giscard's strong points. Whereas Mitterrand is considered "best" for ensuring employment, social justice, and even the struggle against inflation. The two men are almost equal as regards freedom of information and individual liberties. Conventional images. Nevertheless, the RPR places a little more confidence in Mitterrand than in Giscard for employment and social justice; the socialists, a little more confidence in Giscard than in Mitterrand for the influence of France in the world and for national defense.

## 10. And if Mitterrand Is Elected...

And if Francois Mitterrand is elected president of the republic on 10 May 1981, do you think that his election will change many things, quite a few things, few things or nothing at all in...

### ...French political life

46% { 16%  
30%  
43% { 32%  
11%  
11%

many things  
quite a few things  
few things  
nothing at all  
no opinion

### ...daily life

11% } 27%  
16% }  
35% } 59%  
24% }  
14%

This is a constant of the polls: for several months, the French have not been expecting any great changes from this presidential election. But curiously, in the hypothesis of a victory for Francois Mitterrand, it is the left that believes most in modifications of political life, whereas the UDF and RPR voters are far more sceptical. Is this a sign that the majority fear a change of regime less since the break between the Socialists and the Communists?

## 11. The Problem of Communist Ministers

If Francois Mitterrand is elected president of the republic on 10 May 1981, do you think there will be Communist ministers in the government or not?

|                                   | <u>PC</u> | <u>PS/MRC*</u> | <u>UDF</u> | <u>RPR</u> |                                       |
|-----------------------------------|-----------|----------------|------------|------------|---------------------------------------|
| There will be Communist ministers | 44%       | 69%            | 49%        | 43%        | *[Revolutionary Movement of the Left] |
| There will not be any             | 27%       | 21%            | 32%        | 31%        |                                       |
| No opinion                        | 29%       | 10%            | 19%        | 26%        |                                       |

This IFOP-LE POINT presidential poll covers two different inquiries. The first concerns the image of the politicians (Tables 1 to 11). It was carried out from 3 to 7 February 1981 among a representative sample of 1,272 French citizens of 18 and older. The second one concerns voting intentions as expressed in ballot boxes. It was carried out from 17 January to 7 February 1981 among a representative sample of 3,148 French citizens of 18 and older.

# Voting Intentions (Responses in Percentages of French Citizens Expressing An Opinion)

## First Round

In the coming presidential election, let us suppose that you had to choose among the following candidates. For whom is it most likely that you would vote?

| Hypothesis 1, with Debre |       |        |        |     | Hypothesis 2, without Debre |                      |        |       |     |     |     |
|--------------------------|-------|--------|--------|-----|-----------------------------|----------------------|--------|-------|-----|-----|-----|
|                          |       | Jan 81 | Sep 80 |     |                             | Jan 81               | Sep 80 |       |     |     |     |
| V. Giscard d'Estaing     | 33    | 2      | 34     | 2   | 37%                         | V. Giscard d'Estaing | 34     | 2     | 37  | 2   | 38% |
| J. Chirac                | 11    | 2      | 8      | 2   | 11%                         | J. Chirac            | 12.5%  | 11    | 2   | 12% |     |
| M. Debre                 | 4.5%  | 7.5%   | 5%     |     |                             | F. Mitterrand        | 21.5%  | 21.5% | 19% |     |     |
| F. Mitterrand            | 21.5% | 21     | 2      | 18% |                             | G. Marchais          | 14.5%  | 15    | 2   | 13% |     |
| G. Marchais              | 14    | 2      | 15     | 2   | 13%                         | B. Lalonde           | 5      | 2     | 5   | 2   | 7%  |
| B. Lalonde               | 5     | 2      | 5      | 2   | 7%                          | Others:              | 12.5%  | 10.5% | 11% |     |     |
| Others:                  | 11    | 2      | 9.5%   | 9%  |                             | A. Laguiller         | 2      | 2     |     |     |     |
| M.-F. Garaud             | 2     | 2      |        |     |                             | M.-F. Garaud         | 2.5%   |       |     |     |     |
| A. Laguiller             | 0.5%  |        |        |     |                             | H. Bouchardeau       | 1      | 2     |     |     |     |
| H. Bouchardeau           | 1     | 2      |        |     |                             | M. Crepeau           | 1.5%   |       |     |     |     |
| M. Crepeau               | 1     | 2      |        |     |                             | E. Hintermann        | 1      | 2     |     |     |     |
| R. Garaudy               | 1.5%  |        |        |     |                             | No opinion           | 23%    |       |     |     |     |
| No opinion               | 23%   |        |        |     |                             |                      |        |       |     |     |     |

| Hypothesis 3, with Coluche |       |   | <u>Jan 81</u> |      |   |
|----------------------------|-------|---|---------------|------|---|
| V. Giscard d'Estaing       | 31    | % | 32            | %    |   |
| Jacques Chirac             | 10.5% |   | 8             | %    |   |
| Michel Debre               | 5     | % | 7             | %    |   |
| Francois Mitterrand        | 19.5% |   | 18            | %    |   |
| Georges Marchais           | 13    | % | 14.5%         |      |   |
| Coluche                    | 6.5%  |   | 11            | %    |   |
| Brice Lalonde              | 4     | % | 3.5%          |      |   |
| Others:                    | 10.5% |   | 6             | %    |   |
|                            |       |   |               |      |   |
| M.-F. Garaud               | 2     | % |               |      |   |
| R. Garaudy                 | 1     | % |               |      |   |
| A. Laguiller               | 1.5%  |   | P. Gauchon    | 1    | % |
| H. Bouchardeau             | 1     | % | A. Krivine    | 0.5% |   |
| M. Crepeau                 | 1.5%  |   | J.-M. Le Pen  | 1    | % |
| J.-C. Delarue              | 0.5%  |   | E. Hintermann | 0.5% |   |
|                            |       |   |               |      |   |
| No opinion                 | 21%   |   |               |      |   |

The most striking phenomenon is Michel Debre's drop, accompanied by a certain rise for Chirac. VGE tends toward his 1974 level. As for Coluche, he loses nearly half of his votes.

## Second Round

Let us suppose that it is now the second round of the presidential election. For which of the candidates do you think it is most likely you would vote?


### Situation 1

|                      |     |
|----------------------|-----|
| V. Giscard d'Estaing | 53% |
| F. Mitterrand        | 47% |
| no opinion           | 29% |

### Situation 2

|               |     |        |     |
|---------------|-----|--------|-----|
| J. Chirac     | 46% | Jan 81 | 51% |
| F. Mitterrand | 54% | Sep 80 | 49% |
| no opinion    | 35% |        | 34% |

The gap between Valery Giscard d'Estaing and Francois Mitterrand, by comparison with the January poll, goes from 54-46 to 53-47. In November 1980 it was 60-40. Thus, VGE's drop in voting intentions continues, but at a slower rate. In the Chirac-Mitterrand hypothesis, the leader of the PS loses a point but continues well in the lead.



In relation to last January, the switching between the first and second rounds (in the event of a VGE-Mitterrand runoff) has evolved as follows:

--Giscard still gets 61 percent of Debre's voters, but attracts only 54 percent of Chirac's voters, as against 60 percent in January. On the other hand, 23 percent of the ecologists vote for him as against 16 percent a month ago.

--Mitterrand, for his part, still obtains between 17 percent and 19 percent of the RPR votes, but makes progress among the Communist voters, among whom one sees a certain thawing. Of Marchais's voters, 61 percent go straight to Mitterrand, as against 56 percent a month ago. The undecided rate drops from 40 percent to 35 percent.

Transfer of Votes from 1st to 2nd Round  
- percentage 1st-round voters for... (Hypothesis 2) -

|                          | Chirac      | Debre | VGE | Ecologists | Mitterrand | Marchais |
|--------------------------|-------------|-------|-----|------------|------------|----------|
| Valery Giscard d'Estaing | 54%         | 61%   | 97% | 23%        | 2%         | 4%       |
| Francois Mitterrand      | 19%         | 17%   | 2%  | 44%        | 95%        | 61%      |
| [illegible]              | [illegible] | 22%   | 1%  | 33%        | 3%         | 35%      |

#### Statement from the Polls Commission

"The Polls Commission has taken note of the poll on 'Jobseekers' Voting' conducted by the IFOP and published in LE POINT of 3 February 1981.

"The Commission has noted that the table giving voting intentions in the first round and in the second round of the presidential elections does not indicate the percentage of persons questioned who did not express themselves, whereas this percentage is indicated for the other questions of the inquiry.

"Now this percentage is especially high, since it represents 37 percent and 45 percent, respectively, of the persons questioned on the two hypotheses considered for the second round. The result of this fact is that the figures published are affected by a big coefficient of uncertainty--first of all, precisely because of the large proportion of persons whose voting intentions are not known, and secondly because, since the inquiry involves a small sample to begin with (281 persons), the results published are for an even smaller number of persons (150 or 180, depending on the case).

"In these conditions, the margin of error is, in at least one of the hypotheses, greater than the gap between the candidates as revealed by the inquiry, which deprives the inquiry of the essential part of its significance."

(Editor's Note: Noted. It was a mistake not to have published the percentage of persons who did not express themselves in the question on voting intentions.

As regards the representativeness of a sample, the IFOP points out that it "depends, to be sure, on the number of persons questioned, but also on the 'poll rate' --that is, the proportion of persons questioned in relation to the reference population, the more or less homogeneous character of a population, the distribution of the points of inquiry, and finally, the sociodemographic representativeness of the sample."

Finally, we note that the low rate of response, in the hypothesis of a Giscard-Marchais second round, is explained by the improbable character of such a runoff. Therefore, it had only a test value in this poll.)

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## D'URSO INTERROGATION, RED BRIGADES INTERVIEW PUBLISHED

## Kidnapped Judge Questioned

Rome L'ESPRESSO in Italian 11 Jan 81 pp 74-90

[Text] Kidnaped judge's ordeal. 'I, Giovanni D'Urso, reply to the BR's question...'. Lengthy, minutely detailed, relentless, the questioning probes Italy's most painful issues: the way the Justice Ministry is set up, the treatment given "repentant" terrorists, the prison issue (with Asinara heading the list). It is a document of terror, as seen by the terrorists and their victim.

The following consists of extensive excerpts from the grilling to which Magistrate Giovanni D'Urso was subjected by the Red Brigades. It is preceded by a few lines of introduction. Pursuant to a request from court authorities we have purged the text of all names mentioned in it. We have also deleted an entire paragraph dealing with the state institutions for prevention and punishment of crime.

"The following consists of excerpts from the first interrogation to which [...] D'Urso was subjected in the people's prison. Elipses [...] indicate portions deleted as irrelevant or, if they follow a name, the descriptions and other data provided by the prisoner concerning individuals who worked with him.

The 'Summons' to the Justice Ministry

QUESTION: You say you are nobody's political protege, meaning that your transfer from the South up to Rome was just a stroke of luck?

ANSWER: No, it was not simply a stroke of luck.

QUESTION: In your opinion, could any ordinary magistrate reach the level you have reached with so little effort?

ANSWER: I had the grade and the seniority. I have shown you that all those who were picked with me had less seniority than I did, so it is quite natural that the most senior magistrate should be put in the toughest job.

QUESTION: The applicants, the people who put in for the job: there were five of them; weren't there any more than that? Word goes out all over Italy that there are job openings at the Justice Ministry, and only five people apply?

ANSWER: Yes, because under the conditions in which the call for applicants was issued, which was the fatal attack on Palma, time is clearly of the essence, isn't it? Palma was killed in January-February 1978, and in March a recorded message went out to all Justice officials instructing them to invite all magistrates who wished to join the ministry to apply.

QUESTION: Did they urgently need a replacement?

ANSWER: A substitute, not a replacement.

QUESTION: So you, in a mere 3 months, decided on a transfer?

ANSWER: That is only logical, since they were looking for substitutes for people. I applied, and then the telegram came. I came to Rome and introduced myself to [...] who told me I would be going to the head office of the institutions for the prevention and punishment of crime. Altavista was out, and I talked with Minervini, who assigned me to Office III.

QUESTION: Your application was followed immediately by an appointment from the minister?

ANSWER: It was understandable that there had to be an emergency procedure because vacant job slots had to be filled. There was nobody in Office III -- or rather there was only one young magistrate.

QUESTION: How long had there been nobody there? Nobody had been assigned there since the revolutionary forces put Margariti out of action?

ANSWER: [...] was assigned, but then he decided to leave after the Palma business.

QUESTION: Why didn't Margariti want to go back? Had he transferred to another office?

ANSWER: Of course, because after he was hurt he didn't want to stay in that line of work.

QUESTION: So, because it was an emergency, they decided to hand the job to you without anybody's putting in a word for you?

ANSWER: I didn't need anybody to vouch for me: all they needed was to look at my personnel file. My whole career was set down there -- everything I had been, every office I had held, ratings, promotions...

QUESTION: Which means that your file proved that you were a reliable man, not that you were competent in any specific area. How did you cope when you got to your new job? Who helped you?

ANSWER: I would consult with Minervini, and often with Director-General Altavista.

QUESTION: Did you go to Minervini when you had major problems that had been bucked up to your office, requiring you to decide where to send a particular prisoner?

ANSWER: Yes, there were those, too.

QUESTION: What did you mean when you said that you would never set foot in your office again?

ANSWER: Well, after this experience I am not going back.

QUESTION: Because you are afraid to stay there?

ANSWER: No, because you won't let me get on with the job any more.

QUESTION: So what will you do?

ANSWER: I'll apply to the Superior Magistracy Council to assign me to judicial duties or to transfer me to another office.

QUESTION: Is that what Margariti did?

ANSWER: Margariti stayed with the ministry; he went into another office. But everybody who left after the Palma killing appealed to the Superior Magistracy Council....

QUESTION: Who left after the Palma business?

ANSWER: A lot of them: four, maybe five....

QUESTION: Why?

ANSWER: Apparently they didn't feel like taking risks. You don't decide to become a magistrate so you can be a target for assassination!

QUESTION: Didn't the ministry have some special procedure for meeting the needs of these magistrates?

ANSWER: They would ask other magistrates to come into the ministry. And I was one of the ones who did.

Office III: Assignments, Transfers, Treatment of Prisoners

QUESTION: How did you reach decisions on security transfers?

ANSWER: On the basis of suggestions from the Institutions and judiciary authorities, from the carabinieri, and the police in general.

QUESTION: Were you pressured? Be more specific.

ANSWER: There were always written recommendations: that is the basis I acted on. For instance, you get a report of attempted escape, or one saying that this or that type is intent on inciting his comrades to violence. This is the rationale.

QUESTION: How do the carabinieri and the police forces who are on the outside find out what goes on inside?

ANSWER: If there are cases that get publicity outside...; if they are inside cases there is the director.

QUESTION: What about people held pending trial, in carabinieri barracks, for instance: do you get reports on them?

ANSWER: Such reports may come in, too.

QUESTION: How do you account for direct commitment for a first offense to a prison like Asinara, when the comrades have been held in a carabinieri barracks?

ANSWER: Obviously there has been a report, as I mentioned earlier.

QUESTION: Do [those reports] use the expression "a particularly dangerous individual"?

ANSWER: They may use it, but it has to be backed up with a tape.

QUESTION: You do not concern yourself with the merits of the report?

ANSWER: I can't go into the merits, because that would interfere with the urgency of the transfer!

QUESTION: So the prison assignment depends on the type of report the police or the carabinieri send in, meaning that they are the ones who decide where the prisoner is to go, and you merely carry out orders?

ANSWER: They make the recommendations.

QUESTION: So the finding is not based on behavior subsequent to capture, but on an evaluation of the individual who has been taken prisoner?

ANSWER: Well, of course you also ask the prison director for an opinion.

QUESTION: Does it seem likely to you that a man who has just been captured and held for 10 days in an underground cell, bound and gagged, could demonstrate any kind of behavior whatsoever?

ANSWER: I believe there are no such cases!

QUESTION: All right, then: you are saying that you decide on assignments and transfers on the basis of reports from the police and the carabinieri concerning the dangerous nature of a prisoner, his potential incitement to violence, or the likelihood that he will try to escape. This evaluation is an a priori judgment, since it cannot be based on the prisoner's behavior in prison during the first 10 days, while he is in solitary confinement.

ANSWER: It may be that the police decide that a particular individual is important, and therefore they assume that the person may have some outside support.

QUESTION: So you agree that the judgment on captured comrades is established on the basis of their being revolutionaries, militant communists, and not on the way they behave in prison.

ANSWER: Anybody who holds a position so prominent as to be able to command assistance in an escape is clearly a dangerous person.

QUESTION: So you make your discrimination on the basis of the recommendations you receive?

ANSWER: No, I do not discriminate: I act on the basis of the recommendations: of course I read them and evaluate them.

QUESTION: You read them...you evaluate them, and, to put it bluntly, you discriminate.

ANSWER: Yes.

QUESTION: Once the messages come to you in your office, do you reach your decision on your own, or do you consult the top people?

ANSWER: There used to be an office reporting directly to the director general in person, there had been this understanding because it was an irregular structure and the director general was supposed to run it. Since there was the [...] on the outside, there had to be a summit at the same level on the inside. So the whole maximum security sector was under the responsibility and guidance of the director general. Since Altavista's death and his replacement by [...] 's rule, things have changed, because he was not a centralizer and lacked Altavista's technical skills, and so those functions were returned to the jurisdiction of Office III. Of recent months, seeing that [...] needed to get some experience and learn the ropes, I ran it.

#### The Differential Strategy and Danger Prognosis

QUESTION: Explain clearly just what the differential strategy is, and what ideology is understood in it.

ANSWER: Security; differentiation in terms of potential danger as motivation, and hence as effect in terms of incentives for security measures: seeing to it that the inmate does not escape, that he does not seize prison guards as hostages, etc.

QUESTION: In your opinion, if there had not been that wave of prison violence in the second half of the Seventies, would there ever have been any special [maximum security] prisons created?

ANSWER: If the prison structures then in place had provided adequate guarantees, then there would be no reason to set up new ones.

QUESTION: At the social level, something different was beginning to surface -- crimes were no longer the traditional ones -- that posed some new problems to the prison administration, too.

ANSWER: The practical point was that in 1976 and 1977 there had been a series of sensational escapes....so the system, in order to deal with the situation...thought it advisable to create structures that would stop escapes.

QUESTION: So the urgent need was to separate the particularly dangerous working-class prisoners to prevent escapes, only escapes?

ANSWER: Escapes, riots, taking guards hostage.

QUESTION: What did all these mean to you?

ANSWER: Disrupting prison life...the inefficiency of the structure which no longer did what it was designed to do.

QUESTION: In more general terms, what was the significance of the fact that it was possible to incite to rebellion -- what was the significance of the rapport between a particular type of prisoners whom you call dangerous, and the general mass of prisoners?

ANSWER: The fundamental aim of any prisoner is to escape.

QUESTION: That applies to all prisoners?

ANSWER: Of course, because there are those who cannot stand prison.

QUESTION: Well, then, this isolation that you ordered was not designed simply to prevent escapes?

ANSWER: ...and other serious disturbances of prison routine.

QUESTION: In other words, it was to prevent any rapport between these dangerous prisoners and the general mass...to prevent disturbances?

ANSWER: Well, disturbances already present or which might arise.

QUESTION: In other words, it was a preventive option: to keep that rapport from leading to an explosive mixture.

ANSWER: That may have been the end result. At the time we screened out the more dangerous prisoners and they were sent to these more secure institutions.

QUESTION: Explain the concept that governs the finding as to whether or not a prisoner is dangerous.

ANSWER: A dangerous prisoner is one who has tried to escape.

QUESTION: Even if he was arrested 10 days previously?

ANSWER: In that case you have to consider the prognosis of threat he may pose in the future, based on his personality and on what crime he has committed.

QUESTION: If somebody just arrested has not seized any prison guard as a hostage or had a chance to try to escape, etc., and is suspected of belonging to an armed group, but not of any specific crime, what are the criteria for picking him out, and upon what factors is the assessment of his becoming a threat in the future based?

ANSWER: On the basis of a prognosis of the probability that he might take advantage of support from outside which would help him escape.

QUESTION: Do you find that this machinery for continual transfers from one prison to another in secret is actually designed to destabilize the people under your governance physically and psychologically?

ANSWER: Absolutely not.

QUESTION: Does the name of Francesco Berardi mean anything to you?

ANSWER: The man who killed himself.

QUESTION: He was not the one who committed suicide, he was the comrade whom you drove into total physical and psychological instability.

ANSWER: It seems to me that happened in Cuneo.

QUESTION: Why did you send him to Cuneo?

ANSWER: It would have been a chance decision!

#### Prisoner Classification and Declassification

QUESTION: How is your office set up for this classification and declassification activity?

ANSWER: It is handled like any other procedures in the dossiers.

QUESTION: Your office is involved in keeping prisoner dossiers: how many people do you have assigned to this work?

ANSWER: There are 30,000 -- maybe 20,000 dossiers, all records work, and the staff numbers more than 50.

QUESTION: That's a lot of people, 50 people. So most of your office concentrates on this classification work. Why is it so important?

ANSWER: It's massive, there's so much of it: correspondence from every prison in Italy flows into our office, and the dossier for every prisoner has to be kept up to date...

QUESTION: Why do you do it this way, by hand, instead of using the central computer?

ANSWER: Because the computer doesn't get the input (from the outlying areas) the way it should: these people don't know how to do it, and there is no specialist staff.

QUESTION: Do you have computer terminals in your office, and what do they enable you to do?

ANSWER: They tell me exactly where what prisoners are at any given time, except that some of the data have been wrong, and I have to go and dig out the file, because, for one thing, sometimes there are transfers on orders from inspectors, which are not recorded.

QUESTION: Does the file help in assessing the potential threat prisoners might pose?

ANSWER: When there is a case to process we pull the file and process it.

QUESTION: In which cases might there be a procedure to process?

ANSWER: Are we talking maximum security, or prisons in general? In general, in cases where there are appeals of any sort..., but for maximum security it might be that the prison directorate itself asks that a prisoner be transferred to an ordinary prison because he has demonstrated good behavior (1).

QUESTION: How do you arrive at this declassification decision? (N.B. Practically it means taking the "maximum security" flag off a prisoner's file. Prisoners with the "maximum security" flag attached to their dossiers now number 800, as D'Urso stated in another interrogation session.)

ANSWER: Whichever prison authority has held the prisoner for some length of time, observed him, and believes that he is not dangerous forwards the recommendation to the ministry.

**QUESTION:** In your own experience, what is the procedure for conducting this study of prisoner behavior? Is there somebody assigned to observe him?

**ANSWER:** That would be the director, or the training officer...by way of a behavioral study with the prisoner's comrades, and with police officers.

**QUESTION:** In practice, what does all that mean? That the prisoner no longer wants to escape, stir up his fellow-prisoners, or incite to riot, that he has accepted the fact that he must serve his term, be a slave for whatever term the judge has stipulated...

**ANSWER:** It might be that in the meantime the sentence has been reduced and the prisoner is thinking about spending the time he has left to serve in peace.

**QUESTION:** Why do you suppose it is that on the special circuit Novara prison stands out as number one by reason of the monthly transfer of a quota of declassified prisoners, to the tune of much publicity from the prison directorate itself, always with the insinuation that if a prisoner behaves, goes along with the system, and doesn't let himself be drawn into trouble, he will be rewarded that way, whereas anybody who makes trouble stays in Novara?

**ANSWER:** Declassification is done in all prisons.

**QUESTION:** Doesn't it occur to you that declassification might be a tool for blackmail and division among the prisoners?

**ANSWER:** You have to look at the angle from which the problem is viewed...theoretically, you might be right.

#### How Office III and Prison Director D'Urso Work

**QUESTION:** Of recent months there have been battles and uprisings by workers held prisoner at Asinara, Nuoro, Fossombrone, Volterra, and Florence... Explain what machinery is set in motion in such cases...

**ANSWER:** The director of prisons gets a message reporting the emergency.

**QUESTION:** What if it happens at night?

**ANSWER:** The prison warden then telephones the ministry and tries to get in touch with the director of prisons or with me; the switchboard has my home telephone number, calls me there, tells me that the director has to talk about a grave situation, and asks me to call him at home...

**QUESTION:** So your office is the first step: they call you at home for job-related questions, after hours...

**ANSWER:** Yes, of course, whenever there is an emergency situation (uprisings, escapes, an inmate suicide who must be sent to hospital).

QUESTION: So the moment something happens, the prison directors get onto the phone and call you. The hot line, when something breaks, is your number.

ANSWER: That's logical, because I am the man who has to make any decision regarding a prisoner. What other office could they call? Of course they can't call directly to Office I (civilian personnel): they would be told politely to get lost. They'll say: "I couldn't care less if the guy has escaped..." I'm the one with the hardest job in the general directorate: getting men into hospital, riots, escapes, everybody tells me, I tell my superiors, and the director general...

QUESTION: Are you authorized to wake up the director general in the middle of the night?

ANSWER: Of course I am. That is, not the one we have now, because I don't know where he lives. But when Altavista was there a lot of wardens had his telephone number, and could talk to him directly. (N.B.: Since Altavista's death in December 1979, the functions of maximum security prisons have been largely shifted to D'Urso's Office III, which he runs in close contact with...).

QUESTION: So now you're the boss. Given the circumstances.

ANSWER: No. the boss [...]

QUESTION: How do you proceed in case of emergency?

ANSWER: I inform the office manager and the director general...when there are sit-tight situations I advise them to call in the local prosecutor or the prison inspector.

QUESTION: So you are the one who tells the warden to bring in the local court authorities?

ANSWER: That's the logical advice to give them...

QUESTION: Do you also advise them to call in the police and the carabinieri?

ANSWER: No; that is entirely up to the warden. I cannot do it from so far away; if he needs advice at that level, let him ask for it, let him call on somebody with more authority than I have. I call the director general, when Altavista was there, that is; now I call [...] because he is my superior.

QUESTION: When there was that protest in Florence by two prisoners (Abatangelo and Bombaci) who did not want to be transferred to Asinara, you said that the decision had been made at the highest level...

ANSWER: They passed it on to me..., I don't know whom I consulted...

QUESTION: How did you proceed in the Nuoro uprising?

ANSWER: I got to the ministry at 0920 hours, found the message, and informed the director general. We went together to find the office manager, and from his office we followed developments in the situation.

QUESTION: You and [....] followed it?

ANSWER: [...].

QUESTION: Had the two of you supported the requests for transfer of worker prisoners? Had you made the plan to transfer them off the island?

ANSWER: Yes, yes.

QUESTION: Why wasn't that conclusion reached?

ANSWER: Because after the two bodies were found the Attorney General decided to make everything available.

QUESTION: And did he make that decision on his own, even though you say the special section had already been destroyed?

ANSWER: The maximum security section was destroyed, but the regular section was still intact.

QUESTION: What kind of treatment did the worker prisoners get? You did not find that, for the first time, mass torture was used? You did not find that the prisoners were chained together in threes, forced to remain standing for 2 days practically naked, or that water was constantly sprayed on them? You did not find that the 20 transferred prisoners were beaten until the blood ran?

ANSWER: How could I have found such a thing!

QUESTION: Because what would have happened had you found such evidence?

ANSWER: I should have reported it to the prison authorities.

QUESTION: Really? Well, then, since as in this case you would have filed a report with the prison authorities, let's talk about Asinara... After the 2 October battle Asinara became the maximum repression center in the special circuit. You know that the worker-prisoner movement is working to get Asinara shut down, and that there have even been some questions raised about the matter by political parties. Yet you, who are responsible not only for assignments and transfers, but also for prisoner treatment at the national level, found out nothing?

ANSWER: I found that [...] had been behind adoption of security measures, searches, package inspection...

QUESTION: Is that all? You didn't find, for instance, that he was having anal searches run? Isn't that a practice you cited in a memo or some such, circulated to all wardens?

ANSWER: No.

QUESTION: What measures did you suggest, then?

ANSWER: Searches, searches of people going to talk with prisoners, searches of packages. I would send prisoners out for exercise in small groups.

QUESTION: Even though you did grant less time out of doors than the regulations called for?

ANSWER: I was not authorized to do that.

QUESTION: You made no findings about food, about the fact that the guards used to spit and urinate on the food? That packages were never delivered? That parcels containing perishable food were left to rot in the mailroom?

ANSWER: No. I did have complaints about delays in delivery.

QUESTION: You did not find that guards were subjecting prisoners to various kinds of torture?

ANSWER: No. There were some things they didn't come to tell me about.

QUESTION: Yet you are responsible for treatment of prisoners.

ANSWER: I did get questions from parliament, and I assigned ... to look into them.

QUESTION: Not an inspector from headquarters?

ANSWER: Then, later on, the central office appointed somebody, I think it was [...].

QUESTION: Who did they send to investigate the maltreatment of Dorigo?

ANSWER: Dorigo was not in Asinara, though; because the authorities had let us know that it would not be a good idea to keep him in Asinara.

QUESTION: So you and the director general sent an inspector from headquarters to inspect a prisoner who was no longer there, whom you had transferred at the same time?

ANSWER: No, he was supposed to look into the overall situation.

QUESTION: But you had specifically removed Dorigo from the area.

ANSWER: No, he was in the custody of the court. He had filed a complaint, and there was an investigation which reported contusions and abrasions.

QUESTION: So there was evidence that he had been beaten.

ANSWER: Apparently there had been a struggle with a guard. I don't recall how many days the doctors said the guard would have to be hospitalized.

QUESTION: So Dorigo was beaten...and what report did the inspector general file on him?

ANSWER: The usual.

QUESTION: And you, who are so devoted to duty: it never occurred to you to call for further investigation?

ANSWER: It is not within my authority to replace a warden; modernization of prison installations is not within my authority; replacement and supervision of military personnel is not within my authority.

QUESTION: Could you decide on your own to make less use of it?

ANSWER: I could not publicly state an opinion contrary to that of my superiors.

QUESTION: Let's say, though, that insofar as knowledge was concerned you saw what was happening: there had been questions in parliament, there was Dorigo all swollen up... yet so far as you were concerned everything was going smoothly? You told us that Asinara, on the special, maximum security prison circuit, was earmarked for the most dangerous of dangerous prisoners. Why?

ANSWER: Because it's an island, and according to the theory I heard, islands are safer than mainland prisons.

QUESTION: From whom did you hear that theory?

ANSWER: From the guidelines passed along to me...

QUESTION: Who ordered you to send that type of prisoner to Asinara?

ANSWER: It is automatic, when a prisoner has escaped several times.

QUESTION: Gianantonio Zanetti, like others, just by way of example, was arrested in Rome this summer, was immediately sent to Asinara, yet had never attempted to escape: he is still in Asinara.

ANSWER: It may well be that some orders came down from the prison authorities; the people I have to answer to are responsible.

QUESTION: Piccioni, 8 days after he was captured; Sivieri, a comrade from Milan; Giovanni Gentile Schiavone -- the papers say that he was transferred from Palmi to Asinara. Why was that?

ANSWER: I don't know. There are guidelines...maybe by accident...

QUESTION: But you said that Asinara is for the most dangerous of the dangerous, and that you would rather keep it below capacity.

ANSWER: I assigned 36 cells, and it may be that some of them have been declassified.

QUESTION: Declassified after assignment to Asinara? Name two.

ANSWER: I can't remember any.

QUESTION: In other words you found no evidence of maltreatment [of prisoners] at Asinara or of mass torture at Nuoro after the battle...

ANSWER: No. There were no suspects.

QUESTION: You found nothing. For instance in the latest Roman case, when comrade Iannelli was subjected to torture, held in an apartment and beaten and tortured for 2 days...

ANSWER: I know nothing about it.

QUESTION: You must have found out something about it to make you decide to send him to the clinic center.

ANSWER: That was the regular clinic report. I was later informed of the police steps to have him hospitalized outside the prison.

QUESTION: Do you mean that with respect to capture, which is now a routine part of the war the military are waging against the revolutionary forces, you have no authority or jurisdiction? You find them after the fact, arrested, beaten, tortured, held in barracks, in cellars, or some anonymous apartment, but they do not concern you, they are not worth investigating.

ANSWER: I cannot do so: that would be outside my jurisdiction.

QUESTION: You are an accomplice in these things. We charge you openly with being such, with covering them up and with allowing them to happen. Your official duties have to do with assignments, transfers, and treatment of prisoners, and it is obvious that you don't want to talk about treatment.

ANSWER: Yes, but treatment is a matter of thousands of little channels.

QUESTION: Precisely, and differentiated into a thousand little channels. You say that screening is done only to guarantee maximum security, and you refuse to admit that it is also designed to annihilate people. We don't believe you, because you are the one, at headquarters level, who is responsible for this structure and for the treatment of prisoners in it.

## The Maximum Security Prisons

QUESTION: Did you make contact with [...] at Palmi?

ANSWER: He came to Rome a couple of times. I talked to him by telephone during periods of tension, for instance just recently about the lack of tables in the cells -- he kept me abreast of the situation.

QUESTION: How are inside and outside security organized? Are there carabinieri inside?

ANSWER: Regular police patrol inside the grounds, and the carabinieri patrol in jeeps around the wall.

QUESTION: Does Bureau XII -- Carabinieri coordination -- have special or different responsibilities with regard to Palmi?

ANSWER: The responsibilities are always the same.

QUESTION: You said that Palmi was assigned a special function in the screening and segregation process.

ANSWER: There is where the biggest communist leaders were concentrated.

QUESTION: Was that a specific decision from the time it was built? Who made the decision?

ANSWER: I think, Altavista was there, maybe he made the decision with ...

QUESTION: On what occasion did you talk with ...? Did he have a room at the ministry, too, like [...]?

ANSWER: Yes, of course. [...] used to meet with people at his own level, at a high level.

QUESTION: What instructions did they give you for Palmi?

ANSWER: The Director General said that that type of institution [words missing] and that that type of prisoner, the big guns in the BR, PL, and NAP, had to be sent there.

QUESTION: How did you go about picking the first 60 people?

ANSWER: A little bit from memory, I don't know... The carabinieri made some instructional lists.

QUESTION: And did they let you have them?

ANSWER: I don't remember. Maybe they did.

QUESTION: So the carabinieri sent you the lists: how did they get them to you?

ANSWER: I told you already that these contacts were always at the [...] level.

QUESTION: Did they [...] come through Bureau XII?

ANSWER: I don't recall exactly, it may be that [...] gave them to me.

QUESTION: But you think it was the carabinieri who made them?

ANSWER: Well, who else could make them?

QUESTION: Why couldn't [...] make them?

ANSWER: It isn't that he had any specific knowledge of the prisoners belonging to the various "factions."

QUESTION: You mean that the carabinieri have a better knowledge of the prisoners?

ANSWER: I think they do.

QUESTION: And you followed instructions to the letter, yet you didn't notice that some of these prisoners were still awaiting trial, whereas others had already been sentenced?

ANSWER: Palmi is a court prison, so there might also be others awaiting trial there.

QUESTION: Did you countersign?

ANSWER: No, Altavista countersigned.

QUESTION: At the carabinieri level, who was directly concerned?

ANSWER: [...].

QUESTION: How did you manage to carry out all the transfers in a single day?

ANSWER: That is the carabinieri's job.

QUESTION: Does that mean that there was close coordination between your office and the carabinieri?

ANSWER: Obviously I informed them through [...], who I believe then told [...].

QUESTION: How did you set up subsequent assignments? On your own? Or did you get further orders?

ANSWER: There were occasional assignments, because maximum capacity had been reached.

QUESTION: You tell me that in the discrimination circuit the two most segregated prisons were Palmi and Asinara. Why Asinara?

ANSWER: Asinara for security reasons. Logistically it is believed one of the tightest because it's on an island.

QUESTION: For what type of prisoner?

ANSWER: The most dangerous, those who have led prison breaks, introduced contraband objects (1), or been involved in riots.

QUESTION: With whom did you settle transfers to Asinara? We understand that ever since Altavista's death it was you who had full authority to make such decisions because ... counted for little or nothing, and for the last month you have actually done it all yourself. So while on Palmi it's the carabinieri who give you suggestions, when it comes to Asinara you decide entirely on your own. On what support base?

ANSWER: Obviously, on the basis of the prisoners' threat rating, I would make the evaluation on the basis of precedents.

QUESTION: What criterion did you follow in assigning prisoners to Messina? What do you think of that prison?

ANSWER: It's a maximum security prison for women, women convicted of terrorist acts.

QUESTION: The same criteria you use for Palmi. The most visible people?

ANSWER: Yes. There are very few cells, and not much room to walk around in. The most dangerous women are sent there, the rest go to sections of various other prisons.

QUESTION: Do you favor some of them?

QUESTION: If you look at the overall prison structure, there are some more secure than others: Brindisi, Bari, Lecce, Reggio Calabria, Pisa, Perugia.

QUESTION: For women, then, you follow the standard for putting the most dangerous at Messina, and scattering the others around.

ANSWER: We don't scatter them. It's a necessity.

QUESTION: Have you had problems with Messina?

ANSWER: There have been some protest demonstrations.

QUESTION: How did you handle them?

ANSWER: We made whatever concessions we could to demands for better food, conversations, socializing.

QUESTION: Why do these concessions come only after struggle action?

ANSWER: The directors sometimes put a strict interpretation on prison reform; if you spot this kind of interpretation, then you take steps.

QUESTION: Still it takes concerted prisoner action. Prisoner struggles have led to something. You didn't make concessions, you were forced to make them.

[...]

QUESTION: How many cells has Trani?

ANSWER: 100 or 120.

QUESTION: Do you consider Trani a particularly secure prison?

ANSWER: It's a new prison, built to modern standards...

QUESTION: Is it a calm prison?

ANSWER: Every now and then there are rumors of attempted escapes, but on the whole there are no big problems.

QUESTION: Why is there such high turnover at Trani? Why so many transfers?

ANSWER: Obviously there were reports, often from the warden, of danger...

QUESTION: It looks to us as though it works like a decompression chamber, more than anything else, where you let things cool off...

ANSWER: [...]

QUESTION: How many cells has Fossombrone?

ANSWER: Around 120.

QUESTION: It has never given you trouble?

ANSWER: Sporadic, isolated incidents. We have recommended staff be on guard against kidnaping, because the most serious incidents we have had there involved police kidnappings.

QUESTION: The latest episode was a prisoner strike action: over what?

ANSWER: They didn't want to go to Asinara.

QUESTION: Who took action at the headquarters level?

ANSWER: We kept an eye on it, [...] and I.

**QUESTION:** Who was in charge of it at the local level?

**ANSWER:** [...] -- I don't remember his name, [...], but I don't know if he made it to Rome in time.

**QUESTION:** At the same time, there was the uprising at Volterra, and you reacted quite differently: at Fossombrone you put down the rising very swiftly, and made some concessions; at Volterra, on the contrary, there was vacillation, an effort to put the rising down with tough tactics. Who was monitoring Volterra?

**ANSWER:** The minister was monitoring it himself because it is a big prison and there was a whole section of 60 prisoners rebelling.

[...]

**QUESTION:** What guidelines did you follow?

**ANSWER:** The negotiations guidelines: they were demanding to be sent anywhere but to Asinara.

**QUESTION:** Are conditions at Volterra those of a maximum security prison?

**ANSWER:** Structurally it is a very safe prison: it's a fortress.

**QUESTION:** How do you single out the very dangerous people from their dossiers?

**ANSWER:** There's the "maximum security" flag.

**QUESTION:** Did you ever see the classification stamps the fascist police used to use, or the files in the central archives stamped "communist," or "dangerous," and so on? Who is [...]

**ANSWER:** [...]

**QUESTION:** The guidelines for assignment to Cuneo?

ANSWER: The usual: prisoners from the North were sent through there.  
[...].

QUESTION: What is the capacity at Novara?

ANSWER: Eighty.

QUESTION: Why is it common knowledge among working-class prisoners that Novara is the equivalent of Asinara, for "common people" who are militant?

ANSWER: No reason that I know of. It is a secure prison, properly run.

QUESTION: You haven't even any knowledge, since it was opened, of the mock executions, and now lately and more frequently than elsewhere, of beatings administered by the handful of bully-boys known as the infamous "squadretta"? You have never heard that it is a "tough" prison?

ANSWER: Not to my knowledge.  
[...]

QUESTION: What is the capacity of Pianosa?

ANSWER: Ninety.

QUESTION: Is Pianosa one of your strong points?

ANSWER: Well, of course, it's an island, you know.

QUESTION: Has it given you problems?

ANSWER: There was a time when there was some tension there.

QUESTION: What happened?

ANSWER: Prisoner protests. Then last year explosives were found there.

QUESTION: You covered up those events, though, to keep them out of the papers; when hacksaws and explosives were found, what was your reaction?

ANSWER: The administration did not report them publicly.

QUESTION: Because if you had released those facts you would have revealed that the maximum security prisons are maximum resistance, maximum organization prisons? That would be a defeat for you.

ANSWER: We did not announce it because there was a trial under way and hence judicial secrecy was in effect, and besides if we had called in the reporters they would not have been satisfied with the bare facts: they would want all the details.

QUESTION: And so you dropped a curtain of silence...  
[...]

QUESTION: What about Ascoli Piceno: how long has it been open?

ANSWER: About a year now, ever since Termini Imerese was shut down.  
[...]

QUESTION: What is the capacity of Ascoli Piceno?

ANSWER: Sixty or so.

QUESTION: What kind of prisoners are sent there?

ANSWER: Only common criminals.

QUESTION: How does it happen that you screened only for common criminals? Was that mere chance?

ANSWER: No, it was a decision by the director general.

QUESTION: What was the point of setting up a prison solely for screened common criminals?

ANSWER: It was an experiment, designed to find out what would happen if we screened out all the politicals.

QUESTION: What sort of "common criminal" must go to Ascoli?

ANSWER: Prisoners with long sentences, and the usual warnings about their being dangerous.

QUESTION: In other words, Ascoli today is the Palmi for "common criminals"?

ANSWER: Yes. They take care not to send political prisoners there.

QUESTION: Just what was this experiment supposed to tell you?

ANSWER: Whether that [screening] would be desirable from the point of view of governability.

QUESTION: What do you mean by governability?

ANSWER: Keeping the inmates quiet, without any disturbances of any kind... But then this business was not my decision.

QUESTION: All you did was to apply the decision faithfully. Are those "common criminals" who get involved in uprisings and become politicized sent to Ascoli?

ANSWER: Yes, we send them there too.

QUESTION: Since you opened that prison, has it been easy to run?

ANSWER: Yes; experiments, of course, have to be long-term things...

QUESTION: You said it was a new prison. What are the security standards?

ANSWER: There is a sound wall surrounding the entire prison, plus an inner wall, and individual cells holding several inmates.

[...]

ANSWER: I don't know if he made any findings...

QUESTION: The warden is paid by the government to make sure that the prisoner is rehabilitated, made ready to find his place in society again, and all those things you tell me.

ANSWER: But if the guard personnel do illegal things, they are not about to run and tell the warden about it!

QUESTION: Did they have to make a report so that he could see Dorigo or the others that had been beaten until the blood ran? If prisoners begin to talk with the warden, the warden would be in a position to know what was going on inside the prison.

ANSWER: If the prisoners tell him. Maybe they don't even trust him, and so they say nothing.

QUESTION: So the warden knows nothing, because the prevailing climate is one of terror and mistrust!

ANSWER: The warden may confine himself to looking after the basic services, such as the kitchen, or staff.

QUESTION: You still insist that you were never aware that abuses were being committed at Asinara [...]. Look: we're not blaming you just for Asinara. Asinara is just a small part of what we blame you for, by comparison with all the rest. You cannot get off merely by claiming "I didn't know." [...]

ANSWER: But, obviously, he was replaced, so something was evaluated.

QUESTION: Obviously you are covering up things higher up, because Asinara is not merely the pest-hole [...] built, but the result of a policy-level determination to find so high a point of deterrence. So this is what you are covering up [...]

QUESTION: You mentioned the differences between prison directors, on the basis of seniority and grade. How does it happen that, as you have told us, all the wardens at maximum security prisons are young, not one with a higher grade or longer seniority than would qualify them as "warden"? How does it happen that you appoint people to run the prisons

you yourself tell us are of critical importance, calling for special political and technical executive abilities, who are very young, just starting out on the lowest rung of the career ladder?

ANSWER: For a senior official who is well advanced in his career such an assignment is a bother, a big one. Certainly it is not a plum.

[...]

ANSWER: That was the only instance.

QUESTION: It was the only one, but also the first. You made an uncomfortable post seem desirable.

ANSWER: [...] was promoted in Altavista's time.

QUESTION: It's a shame that Altavista is dead: you blame everything on him... It's a race between us and nature!

ANSWER: No, I didn't blame him, I was objective. Of course I cannot take the blame for things...

QUESTION: Getting back to [...], in short, his promotion stirred ambition in the others. People are not eager to take over running a maximum security prison?

ANSWER: Some of them are uncomfortable, isolated, and dangerous...

QUESTION: Dangerous even though the revolutionary forces have not hit many at that level. Traversi was the only one who got what he deserved ... These young wardens: how did you select them? It seems peculiar for a ministry to set up a super-secure system, and then be forced to man it with officials at the lowest level.

ANSWER: It might be a contradiction, a difficulty in finding more senior people.

#### Treatment of 'Penitents'

QUESTION: Let's look now at those you treat well, those you call the repentant ones. Spies, reprobates, and so on. What do you say?

ANSWER: When this phenomenon first surfaced, Altavista reached an understanding with the various judiciary authorities that they would do it and say nothing about it...then this order was followed by [...] too, so that it was the prison authorities who cast about for the most suitable prison.

QUESTION: So you had nothing to do with assignments? How do you manage to decide that Peci goes to Pescara rather than somewhere else?

ANSWER: The only two cases are those of Peci and Fioroni, who had been screened out earlier.

QUESTION: Whose decision was it to send them to that particular prison (to Pescara)?

ANSWER: I don't know: it must have been a request from the prison authorities.

QUESTION: And you countersigned it.

ANSWER: I believe so, but at the time it was the director general who endorsed such requests.

QUESTION: Why did he choose Pescara, and not some other prison?

ANSWER: I don't know. The prison authorities sent a message asking that he be held in a prison not too far from the venue of the trial, that would guarantee his security.

QUESTION: But the trial was held in Turin..., is Pescara close to Turin?

ANSWER: It's not far.

QUESTION: The moment he was arrested, Peci was sent to Cuneo. Why?

ANSWER: Because everything that happens in Piedmont comes down to Cuneo and Novara.

QUESTION: And then?

ANSWER: I don't know.

QUESTION: You must know. You're the one who countersigns.

ANSWER: ... I may have briefed the prosecution...he went to Pescara because it was believed to be a secure facility.

QUESTION: Secure against what? Because you thought Peci would escape?!

ANSWER: ...partly to protect him from the other prisoners.

QUESTION: So the first concern about Peci was not that he might escape, but to protect him; what orders did you give?

ANSWER: To guard him with particular attention... to keep him isolated.

QUESTION: How many prisoners are you holding at Pescara?

ANSWER: None... except there are the common criminals. There is a holding section and a criminal one.

QUESTION: Which one is Peci in?

ANSWER: I don't know -- perhaps the isolation section or the transit section -- I don't know.

QUESTION: So the first order was to keep him isolated, and then what other orders did you give?

ANSWER: To make sure he wasn't attacked.

QUESTION: Where did the suggestion that he be sent to Pescara come from? From the carabinieri or from the court authorities?

ANSWER: Those are contacts at the director general's level.

QUESTION: They always say that you make a plan to transfer people (for trial) and to have them brought back to their original place of confinement.

ANSWER: For people under indictment, not when they go to testify.

QUESTION: And where did he sleep?

ANSWER: I don't know.

QUESTION: What do you mean, you don't know?

ANSWER: They are taken directly to prison...conveyance to prison is a carabinieri job.

QUESTION: If he was committed to a prison you must know about it.

ANSWER: He might have been conveyed directly.

QUESTION: You mean he didn't sleep... That means that for Peci there was a special order for treatment that was out of your hands, that his was a special case.

ANSWER: That happens to other prisoners when they are to appear before a magistrate close to the prison in which they are confined.

QUESTION: But this was certainly not a case of the nearest prison. Where did you put the other heinous criminals?

ANSWER: The only one I know is Fioroni.

QUESTION: What about Sandalo?

ANSWER: I don't know. I lost sight of him.

QUESTION: Where is he? Sandalo is nowhere to be found in the prison system? Have you already released him?

ANSWER: I don't know where he wound up, all I know is when he came to Rome to testify before the committee investigating the Donat Cattin case.

QUESTION: Where did he go afterwards? Back to where he was before?

ANSWER: I don't know.

QUESTION: You are in charge of the assignment and transfer section, and you don't know where a prisoner is?

ANSWER: I told you that these are very high-level contacts.

QUESTION: You no longer know whether or not Sandalo is somewhere in the prison system, you can't even tell me that he is?

ANSWER: I don't know where he is.

QUESTION: He was arrested 2 whole months ago. So Sandalo was arrested in April, and here it is June, but you still don't know where Sandalo is?

ANSWER: No.

QUESTION: Right now? It is 8 months since April, which means we can't still be in the arrest period, and you still don't know where Sandalo is?

ANSWER: I don't know.

QUESTION: Is this a regular occurrence or not?

ANSWER: It has been known to happen.

QUESTION: Is it a regular occurrence?

ANSWER: In some cases the prison authorities, with authorization in turn from people in authority within the prison system, find that for security reasons one may deviate from a regulatory rule.

QUESTION: So here we have a clear breach of regulations: just what would these security reasons be?

ANSWER: Security reasons -- keeping anyone from discovering the prisoner's whereabouts.

QUESTION: Why?

ANSWER: To avoid reprisals.

QUESTION: Reprisals, you say: if they tell you where he is you may be the target of reprisals, is that it?

ANSWER: They don't tell me! Telling anybody sets off a whole lot of machinery, and all this sort of thing can lead to leaks of information.

QUESTION: So we have already seen that for some people who are arrested it turns out that the arrested person becomes a hostage to the one who arrested him, and that nobody else knows where he is, except maybe the organization that captured him, or ordered his arrest. We have seen that for certain special prisoners, the ones who show remorse, the infamous traitors, the rules are actually broadened, eased, and this anonymity lasts not merely 20 to 30 days, but as long as 8 months. Is this true? You tell me again yourself: you don't know where Sandalo is?

ANSWER: No. No.

QUESTION: And you say this this is an exception, an exception made for security reasons?

ANSWER: For security reasons.

QUESTION: You cannot even tell me if Sandalo is being held in any prison... Yet you have a switchboard that can put you into instant communication with any prison.

ANSWER: But these are kept secret.

QUESTION: Kept secret from the man in charge?

ANSWER: Certainly.

QUESTION: What about Viscardi? And Barbone? Where are they?

ANSWER: I don't know. I know where only three of them are: Fioroni, Peci, and Paghera.

QUESTION: Where is Paghera being held?

ANSWER: He should be at San Gimignano.

QUESTION: Only three individuals, only three dirty traitors -- you know where they were assigned, you can put your finger on them, but you know nothing about the others, nobody tells you anything. If somebody calls you at the ministry and asks you where such and such a person is, what do you tell them?

ANSWER: I ask them to tell me what jurisdiction he belongs to and then I get in touch with that jurisdiction for information.

QUESTION: Let's suppose I call up and ask you about Sandalo; will you tell me he is being held in a prison?

ANSWER: Since I have received no indication of his release, I assume he is still being held.

QUESTION: You assume, because you are not sure of that.

ANSWER: I don't know.

QUESTION: Are you sure or not?

ANSWER: I don't know.

QUESTION: He might not be in prison?

ANSWER: Well, I don't know. We'd have heard if he had been released.

QUESTION: How would you have known?

ANSWER: The press would have got wind of it.

QUESTION: Yet you cannot tell me for certain that he is being held in some prison?

ANSWER: No, I cannot say for sure.

QUESTION: Do you have some suspicions?

ANSWER: No, no.

QUESTION: That he wound up somewhere?

ANSWER: No, I don't know what became of him.

QUESTION: How do you explain that, since one of the duties of your office is to decide on prison assignments and prisoner transfers, as well as prisoner treatment?

ANSWER: An exception was ordered from [...] for security reasons.

QUESTION: The order from [...] was not the same as the first one. Did they ask you for this new one when you took over the situation? Who told you about it?

ANSWER: Probably no one. I don't know.

QUESTION: He is actually more ignorant than you are. [...] stepping in on a situation like this one, he would have asked for information, would have been briefed? By whom?

ANSWER: Information about what?

QUESTION: About the prison system. The main problem in Italy today, according to the press, and according to what you say yourself, he would have been briefed on this. He would have been briefed by the person who gave him the job.

...

Question: At your level, the top level, national headquarters, chef de cabinet, did you ever talk about this problem? You were never briefed about anything, and you simply went on quietly tending your garden without setting foot into this field: why? Because you were afraid of stepping on toes?

ANSWER: Well, that field was off limits to me, and so I stayed away from it.

QUESTION: Do you have orders in writing, warning you away?

ANSWER: You don't need written orders...

QUESTION: How did they tell you it was off limits? Did they telephone you?

ANSWER: No, they didn't call me. The director general made the decision. Altavista.

QUESTION: All this business has been going on ever since Altavista's day? What did Altavista tell you, in so many words?

ANSWER: That for these special prisoners it would be better not to let it be known where they were being held, and that the court authorities would handle it.

QUESTION: And it would be well if you didn't know either?

ANSWER: But I keep telling you, it wasn't I, personally, who knew about it, it was the whole office, and so when a case goes into a particular system then it's easy to get news leaks.

QUESTION: Since that phenomenon was still fairly limited in good old Altavista's time, it seems to have multiplied lately...

ANSWER: It may be that with [...] this arrangement was emphasized by somebody.

QUESTION: You don't know whether it was emphasized, but you say you think it must have been.

...

ANSWER: Then it must have been emphasized again later on.

QUESTION: This idea of setting aside a special prison for repentant prisoners: did you discuss it at all?

ANSWER: I think the director general [...] mentioned it, in coordination with the carabinieri....It's still under study.

QUESTION: But the attitude toward the idea: positive or negative?

ANSWER: I think they decided to study it in more depth.

QUESTION: Why do you think they want to concentrate all these special prisoners in one place?

ANSWER: I don't know that they want to concentrate them; (in favor) there is the fact that concentrating these prisoners would involve a concentration of security measures; (against it) is the riskiness of the objective itself... it would be easy to identify the prison, whereas if they were diluted...

QUESTION: What is the policy with regard to the repentant prisoners? Specifically, how do they plan to use them vis-a-vis the militant movement and the prisoner proletariat?

ANSWER: That is a matter for the court authorities.

QUESTION: It's your problem, too, because the ministry has to work through a series of cogs and wheels, some big, some little, but all of them turning; it wouldn't work at all if, at certain levels like yours, conflicts and contradictions arose, such as, for instance: that one has repented of his evil ways, but he has nevertheless been convicted of serious crime and in any case is to be considered a high risk, and then you take it upon yourself to send him to a special prison. So they have certainly involved you in this whole problem.

ANSWER: It's not a question of taking it upon myself, because there is always an order from higher up... when you trace it back you may find a policy decision for which the minister is the channel. The minister makes a finding, and I certainly cannot challenge it.

QUESTION: In other words, you would have been made a tool, so to speak?

ANSWER: I am used in a specific role... but when there are general problems that go beyond that role, then I am bypassed... for instance on that strategy applied to this type of prisoner.

QUESTION: You mean the fact of special treatment for these infamous traitors; so you accept it, it is a fact, and you say that it is a strategy.

ANSWER: There must be a standard for treatment, it must be chosen.

QUESTION: You have no voice in such choices? And you don't even try to get to the bottom of them. That would be your duty, just as it was your duty to get the word about Asinara. If you were to find out that Peci was in Latin America, wouldn't you feel partly responsible?

ANSWER: No, because it would have been a policy decision that sent him there.

QUESTION: What do you think of deratization?

ANSWER: From your point of view it makes sense.

QUESTION: And from your point of view?

ANSWER: From our point of view... our... according to the comments by [...] we must admit this information... the information given us by these prisoners who are repentant.

QUESTION: Then this is the source of special treatment for the "penitenti"...you keep them out of the reach of those who would mete out justice to them. Isn't the fact that several infiltrators and spies have already been dealt with a problem for you?

ANSWER: I have no information about the Nuoro people.

QUESTION: The facts are that one of them had always been a spy, and that the other was a quasi-carabiniere, a man who had received a minimum sentence and who had gone to prison on the carabinieri payroll.

ANSWER: This is not the kind of information that reaches the central level.

QUESTION: This network of infiltrators, spies, and the like, which the carabinieri put together "with great skill": how is it designed?

ANSWER: I should be very curious to know.

QUESTION: Was it designed by the carabinieri's telling you, "Send me this one, and then that one," etc.?

ANSWER: I don't deny that I may be bypassed in the process for other reasons, but without involving me at all.

QUESTION: There is a whole slice of the prison administration, then, that you no longer have any control over.

ANSWER: It is out of my control because it is within the police authority's bailiwick.

QUESTION: This is in conflict with the separation of powers.

ANSWER: When special needs arise.

QUESTION: You mean that the police power has grown recently?

ANSWER: If the police authorities tell me to transfer a prisoner I must transfer him; then if I want to transfer him and I don't get the approval from the police, he stays where he is.

QUESTION: Even so, the police authorities might not tell you!

ANSWER: It's better not to tell me, because that information passes through a great many hands.

QUESTION: Are you telling me that the police authorities do not trust their colleagues in the magistracy who have administrative functions? Do you have Sandalo's file?

ANSWER: No.

QUESTION: That is a felony. You belong to the central headquarters.

ANSWER: There is no rule that says I must hold all files.

QUESTION: What if somebody were to raise a question in parliament?

ANSWER: I would appeal to the head of the secretariat, he would appeal to the director general, and he in turn would appeal to the police authorities.

QUESTION: This is clearly something very remarkable: the police authorities take away your authority over a whole class of prisoners who serve their interests, their war plans. The Sandalo and Barbone maneuvers could only have been pulled off under cover, from who knows where... There is no excuse for your turning a blind eye to these matters.

ANSWER: I cannot challenge what my superiors decide to do. If there is an overriding security consideration.

About the Committees for Struggle

QUESTION: This enemy is the most dangerous of all, and not only because he tries to escape, but because he has political potential.

ANSWER: Actually I have never admitted people [to prison] who had any political capacity.

QUESTION: Because there is no political capacity in preparing and pulling off an escape?

ANSWER: But I look at this from the technical point of view.

QUESTION: Then what you consider from the technical angle has a political significance because you yourself said -- and this is where you contradict yourself -- that the decision to set up maximum security prisons was made at the policy level, didn't you? Because the problem of annihilating, destroying the active hostility of a class that fights on the outside and continues to fight on the inside is a political problem? And then you reduce it to the level of individuals.

ANSWER: That's a working approach, not an attitude. It was a working procedure.

QUESTION: This working approach of yours, then, invents a theory of individual troublemakers, and sets it against a reality of a whole class that keeps on working, in spite of your efforts -- subtle or brutal -- to divide it. Just what do you, personally, think the Committees for Struggle are?

ANSWER: They are loose organizations of prisoners whose purpose is to continue a political struggle inside the prisons.

QUESTION: Do they exist or don't they?

ANSWER: It may be that they exist.

QUESTION: What do you mean: "It may be"?

ANSWER: I don't know: it's not that I am aware of the committee at Trani.

QUESTION: Do they exist, or don't they?

ANSWER: I believe they do.

QUESTION: Which means that these are organizations the prisoner proletariat has set up for itself. What does this organization have as its purpose?

ANSWER: Purposes of political struggle.

QUESTION: What would those be? What have you found them to be?

ANSWER: Ah, that I don't know.

QUESTION: Since you don't know, the practices and procedures of the last few years haven't shown you?

ANSWER: A struggle against the system, a struggle against the structures.

QUESTION: Who waged the battle of Asinara prison on 2 October?

ANSWER: These prisoners.

QUESTION: This organized structure. What about the other battles in the various camps, Nuoro: who waged that one? So what do you call this organizational thrust? Is it an urgent political demand?

ANSWER: Yes, of course it is.

QUESTION: You see how we come back to the heart of the problem? In the face of this political demand, what is your attitude?

ANSWER: No particular attitude.

QUESTION: What do you mean, no particular attitude? What attitude?

ANSWER: I have always considered these problems from a security angle.

QUESTION: All right, then: in security terms, what does it mean that a Committee for Struggle has been born, has been put together inside a prison? That there are problems there?

ANSWER: You have to find out if these political intentions are hardened into operational realities.

QUESTION: A Committee for Struggle, though, whether or not it succeeds in setting up escapes, is designed to make some impact on the situation. Is the fact that a Committee for Struggle is formed an occurrence that you assess and if so, how do you evaluate it?

ANSWER: These are not my problems, because I have been given the means to make things work, in terms of security: if they want me to use that means for other purposes, they must tell me so.

QUESTION: Now, about those security terms: the fact that a representative entity, a Committee for Struggle, is formed in a prison by working-class inmates, it causes you no problems. What problems does it cause you?

ANSWER: If it displays actual operations in the sense of plans for uprisings, escapes, etc., well, then...

QUESTION: What steps do you take then?

ANSWER: I intervene when the director shows me a specific dangerous situation.

QUESTION: What decisions are taken?

ANSWER: What decisions are taken... if there is somebody who actually shows this potential for escaping, or for fomenting an uprising, that person is taken away.

QUESTION: The individuals who are most...

ANSWER: Dangerous.

QUESTION: What does this mean to you? Merely a question of getting the most dangerous men out of the prison, or breaking the internal struggle front by getting rid of a handful of prisoners who have helped put the organization together? What you try to do is not merely to transfer the individual, but to cut off this organization's political power.

ANSWER: Well, yes, but he winds up.

QUESTION: Does he really?

ANSWER: In another prison where he can do the same thing.

QUESTION: All right, but then you transfer him again out of that other prison. But is it really true that you achieve your goal of lowering the threat posed by the Committees for Struggle by transfers?

ANSWER: But I am not the one who examines the question of the Committees for Struggle. I investigate the case of the individual inmate.

QUESTION: You told me that that portion of the Committee for Struggle which shows the greater potential threat, the greatest capacity.

ANSWER: Not the greatest potentials, let's get that straight.

QUESTION: What is high-risk for you is ability and endurance to the working-class prisoner.

ANSWER: What I mean is that I try constantly to base my decision on objective factors when I order a transfer. The capacity for escape, the likelihood of escape -- these are objective factors.

QUESTION: From the point of view of your class, your objective factors are your ability to be a slaughterer; from our point of view the capacity of the working-class prisoner is his capacity to build politically, to escape. We can never reach an understanding on this. What to us is the capacity and will to struggle, for you is tantamount to high-risk, and on the basis of that high risk factor you try to destroy the Committees for Struggle. Is that true?

ANSWER: From your point of view.

QUESTION: In the case of a particularly aggressive Committee for Struggle, you said, that is preparing to do this or that on the basis....

ANSWER: I did not mention Committees for Struggle. Action is always concerned only with the individual prisoner.

QUESTION: Yes, that's clear.

ANSWER: In any case, the guidelines here are clear.

QUESTION: Even so, you told me that as soon as a Committee for Struggle demonstrates that it can make an impact on the internal situation you would have to take steps, you and your superiors together, and in this case you pick out the high-risk individuals: have you ever done that?

ANSWER: In those terms, no. I have done it only when the director made a recommendation for transfer. Then I would evaluate it, and if I agreed that that prisoner did in fact represent a high risk as a single individual, then I transferred him.

QUESTION: If, as you say, the Committees for Struggle press political demands, why don't you give them the political space they need to make their programs known? Why, if the Committees for Struggle write a proclamation, is it never made public? Why do you prohibit any contact with the outside by the Committees for Struggle?

ANSWER: Contact with the outside? With whom?

QUESTION: For example, we hear nothing about Committee for Struggle programs, yet we know that they have them.

ANSWER: I wouldn't know about that. Obviously, the wardens stop them.

QUESTION: You wouldn't stop them, though?

ANSWER: Once it were ascertained that they were criminal in content it would be my duty to stop them.

QUESTION: But in a Committee for Struggle program there would only be felonious content because, for one thing, one non-negotiable point in their program will inevitably be release.

ANSWER: If there is felonious content, any official of the state has the power and the obligation to prevent the commission of felonies.

QUESTION: That makes it automatic. So the whole thing becomes an effort to deny the existence of the Committees for Struggle, not merely to stop their functioning..., to stop them from publicizing their programs, but actually to deny the existence of the Committees for Struggle. Do you admit this?

ANSWER: No, because if they are purely political statements, free of incitement to crime, free of instigation to armed struggle against the state.

QUESTION: A more specific question: According to you, do the Proletarian Prisoners in the regular and special prisons engage in struggle or do they not?

ANSWER: You have to look at what they are struggling for.

QUESTION: Do they or do they not struggle? Are there struggles? Do they accept your type of organization or do they challenge it?

ANSWER: There are some who accept it and some who challenge it.

QUESTION: Why is there a whole slice of them who don't?

ANSWER: That is as may be.

QUESTION: Is there or isn't there?

ANSWER: I believe there is.

QUESTION: Was the battle in Asinara a rejection?

ANSWER: Obviously they don't accept it.

QUESTION: There it is. Now how do you explain the fact that the Prisoner Proletariat goes on fighting in spite of the kind of organization

you have adopted, in spite of the kind of organization that led to the establishment of two separate kinds of system, ordinary and special? I should like to know why you think that, in spite of all this, the Prisoner Proletariat keeps on fighting?

ANSWER: Evidently since, not having achieved their objectives, they keep struggling.

QUESTION: And what do you think the Prisoner Proletariat's objectives are?

ANSWER: There might be any number of them; they might be compound; they might be all sorts of things...

QUESTION: Would you try to list some of them for me?

ANSWER: Improvement in prison living conditions, perhaps rejection of the prevailing system today -- there are a lot of them.

QUESTION: The watchword in the latest struggles has been to shut down Asinara, whatever it takes.

ANSWER: That's an objective, too.

QUESTION: And why do you think they want to achieve that objective?

ANSWER: Obviously they think prison conditions are deplorable and so they don't want to wind up in that particular prison.

QUESTION: Doesn't that sound to you like a watchword that the whole of the Prisoner Proletariat would agree on?

ANSWER. Yes, yes.

QUESTION: Haven't events proved that to you?

ANSWER: One might also assume that they believe it is one of the tightest of the maximum security prisons.

QUESTION: Doesn't it seem to you that events in Nuoro and Asinara have proved that your efforts to divide political from common criminals have not worked? How many common criminals were involved in the Nuoro uprising? Were most of those involved common criminals or political criminals?

ANSWER: I don't know. No, because I don't know the mix there.

QUESTION: That day you said you spent with others setting up the transfer after the uprising. Surely you remember that?

ANSWER: I didn't do any screening to see how many were common criminals and how many were political.

QUESTION: That struggle was waged jointly by both classes of prisoners. What does that mean to you?

ANSWER: Clearly the regular prisoners recognized that the others' demands were right.

QUESTION: Do the ordinary prisoners have the same objectives as the politicals?

ANSWER: In that case.

QUESTION: How do you explain that?

ANSWER: I'd have to be a sociologist, or a politician. The politicals would merely have to spread the notion of abolition of prison, and of course everybody in prison would think it an excellent idea.

QUESTION: But why should everybody in prison think it an excellent idea to abolish prison?

ANSWER: Well, in this particular case there was that particular mix.

QUESTION: Doesn't it demonstrate the bankruptcy of your entire strategy? The Palmi strategy, for instance, the trick of segregating the politicals from the common criminals, what we call discrimination.

ANSWER: It may well be that in this case that line proved wanting.

QUESTION: Meaning that then you had to make it more sophisticated, make the surgeon's hand a little more skillful.

ANSWER: If you force me to reply, I believe that is the answer.

QUESTION: But doesn't it look to you to be more deeply rooted now than ever, this whole body of ideas in the minds of the Prisoner Proletariat, this determination to abolish prison, this determination to escape, this right to freedom? Doesn't it seem to you that it has already taken root in most of the Prisoner Proletariat? And so sooner or later all your efforts at more or less scientific screening are doomed to fail, to come to naught against this fact of the Proletariat that is organizing, that is building its mass structures? Or are you still convinced that the approach you are taking is the best? From your point of view, not ours. Are there no flaws in it? Has it proved efficient and adequate? Try to assess it over the 2 years since you joined the ministry?

ANSWER: Since you would force me to evaluate it, I cannot see it. These are matters that call for careful study.

QUESTION: Since I believe that you are not without brains, that you are an administrator keenly aware of your sins, well aware of what you do, I believe that you have already weighed this question. Come on, now: look at the record. You said that 500 dangerous prisoners are now concentrated in the maximum security prisons. You have devoted

2 to 3 years to this operation. What happened after all that time? The prison system has not been pacified: true or false? Do you consider it pacified?

ANSWER: No, clearly there have been these cases..., pacification has been disproven.

QUESTION: Is pacification one of your objectives?

ANSWER: The fundamental objective of the special prison system was security.

QUESTION: Pacification was also a fundamental objective too, though? Yes? Or no?

ANSWER: Yes, yes.

QUESTION: Then the events of these past few years have demonstrated that pacification is feasible?

ANSWER: But this is all a huge problem that is involved with the fundamental problems of the nation. The prisons aren't the only problem we have in Italy.

QUESTION: Would you please explain that carefully?

ANSWER: You have to see whether there is pacification in the state before you even try for pacification in the prisons.

QUESTION: Which is to say?

ANSWER: The prison system, all our institutions are a reflection of society.

QUESTION: And so...

ANSWER: And so there are problems that must be studied: you can't just make a blanket evaluation on the basis of prisoners.

QUESTION: They are nothing more than a reflection: what does that mean?

ANSWER: The state of ferment you see in society is to be found in the prisons as well, as it is in the schools and in the administration.

QUESTION: So what does it mean to say that if the guerrilla war is not stopped outside you cannot stop the struggle inside the prisons, either?

ANSWER: That might very well be an idea.

QUESTION: I'm asking you.

ANSWER: Pacification in the state in general must come first.

QUESTION: Just which road is the state taking now to calm things down?

ANSWER: That... well, it's too much for me to answer.

QUESTION: Try to think it through.

ANSWER: The trend is toward trying...

QUESTION: Trying to do what?

ANSWER: To get some results.

QUESTION: By what means?

ANSWER: The major issue of the moral crisis might be one attempt.

QUESTION: In what direction is the state moving with respect to pacification?

ANSWER: The state is subject to a great many constraints, some of them are even economic in nature.

QUESTION: It hasn't got enough money?

ANSWER: We are in the midst of a depression.

QUESTION: Which means the state cannot do what?

ANSWER: And so all this of course serves to aggravate every problem.

QUESTION: Quite right: we too believe that the structural crisis in which capitalism is floundering brings with it some grave problems, and calls for a decision. What sort of line is the state following in its attempts to solve the problems that have arisen and are growing more serious?

ANSWER: Quite sincerely, I don't know.

QUESTION: In your view, is the state broadening its democratic instruments? Is it conducting reforms? Does it seem to you that it has taken other measures? Wasn't .... once in prison? Where did they put him? Do you know what .... is doing?

...

Question: Doesn't it look to you as if they have put military prefects in charge of certain cities? Doesn't it look to you as if they are also following -- because we can never rule out the so-called democratic path -- that they are following or being forced to follow a military strategy? To resolve with force an irreconcilable contradiction, by which I mean a spreading guerrilla war? Does it look like that to you, or doesn't it?

ANSWER: Uh -- well, I believe steps are being taken in that area as well, that things are moving.

QUESTION: The thousands of arrests over the past few months, then: do these not constitute evidence of failure for this attempt to destroy a whole area of dissent that is fighting, that has already chosen armed struggle? If this is the strategy outside the prison system, inside it there is even more evidence of this line of relying on the military. Basically, the prison system was the first place in which imperialism and the Italian state gave up on the job and handed it to the military. They didn't know how to handle the escape problem, so they handed surveillance over to the military. The war strategy began with the prison system. The cost of that decision reminds us that not only does it not solve the problem of the ratio between guerrilla warfare and anti-guerrilla operations, but actually saddles the prison system with still more problems. Right?

ANSWER: That might prove to be accurate.

QUESTION: Come on! Even now, how are you handling all these monthly arrests? Where do you send them?

ANSWER: They're probably all in the big prisons.

QUESTION: But they are not a problem for you? If they are dangerous elements because they have connections with the outside? What line do you plan to take?

ANSWER: Thus far, the problem has not arisen.

QUESTION: What do you mean, it hasn't arisen? What were the guidelines issued at the administrative level?

ANSWER: The problem had not yet given rise to demonstrations such as to necessitate...

QUESTION: You hadn't been faced with them in so tragic a fashion? What? Were you blind, then? Or did you already have solutions in mind?

ANSWER: No.

#### The Outlook for the Security Prison System

Question: About those prisoners whom you refer to as singled out: where do you intend to put them, since the capacity of your maximum security prisons ranges between 750 and 800 inmates?

ANSWER: In emergency situations we can use other safe prisons: Volterra, Porto Azzurro, San Gimignano, Saluzzo, Bari, Lecce, Favignana, or Termini Imerese.

QUESTION: What do they mean -- all these new prisons (Turin, Bergamo, Perugia, Leghorn, Florence, and all the rest of them) that are sprouting like mushrooms?

ANSWER: They mean upgrading and expansion of the prison system. In fact, the 1977 decree instituting the maximum security prisons said: "until such time as the government shall have suitable structures..."

QUESTION: Is it possible today, in your view, and in view of the current revolution-counter-revolution balance, that the executive might decide to shut down the maximum security system?

ANSWER: No, because there are no other facilities that can perform their function.

QUESTION: And so?

ANSWER: And so, as these facilities are gradually created...

QUESTION: The system is expanded.

ANSWER: No, no! That's not the idea. The idea is to make all the prisons secure.

QUESTION: Turn them all into maximum security prisons?

ANSWER: No, turn them all into secure prisons, not maximum security prisons (!). The ideology is different: it is turned around; in practice all prisons should meet security standards and above all they should meet the prison reform standards.

QUESTION: In other words, you will abolish the distinction between regular prisons and maximum security prisons by bringing them all up to security standards. That's perfect! This is a real nazi-style reform you're talking about. The purpose is no longer to restructure a part of it, but the whole prison system -- the whole prison system must now afford whatever security is required.

ANSWER: Not only must it afford security: it must also afford decent living conditions and comfort.

QUESTION: Comfort? Look, if you're talking about color TV sets, we don't give a damn about them! You have already demonstrated that decent living conditions are incompatible with security standards...

ANSWER: Prison regulations stipulate that inmates must have rooms to themselves...

QUESTION: Rooms to themselves: exactly. And your way of interpreting decent living standards is to provide isolation in cells. Your model, in fact, is the new Florence prison, which is a kind of Italian-style Stammheim. Florence was to be a metropolitan reformatory of the new kind, built to security standards stiff enough for a brand-new super-modern concentration camp. I saw in a newspaper how it is built: architecturally, it is fairly daring -- something like an inverted funnel in appearance, so as to make single-cell isolation easier. There are no

bars, your experts tell us: they have been replaced with reinforced concrete panels, which are more humane...

ANSWER: But there is security!

QUESTION: There are thin panels of reinforced concrete which are still more secure. You have already tested the cell security systems. I remember 3 years ago the newspapers mentioned a tour of the construction site by Altavista, Minervini, and Palma and some other cops who had gone there especially to try out a new device for opening and closing cells. The foundations had not even been poured, and already they were testing the security systems! Every bit of the construction there is designed for security: the ministry standard nowadays is security, total security... Exactly as you said. Sure, we are humanitarians, but we also like to hedge our bets. We are egalitarians and so what we create is not a system of discrimination, but a system of security, and it is clear that you have spelled out a standard that is exactly criminal.

ANSWER: It is not our doing, it is the result of a policy decision which is already embodied in the decree establishing the maximum security prison system. It is clear that if you build a prison you build it so that people cannot get out. Once you have security in the prison it becomes possible to provide humane treatment. We can never reach agreement, you and I, because you reject the whole prison system, the whole function of prisons.

QUESTION: That's right. We reject the very idea of prisons... we want to destroy all prisons.

#### Red Brigade Interview

Rome L'ESPRESSO in Italian 11 Jan 81 p 70

[Article by Mario Scialoja]

[Text] The Red Brigades have decided to grant an interview, and to release a transcript of their "interrogation" of Judge Giovanni D'Urso, and in so doing have adopted a strategy different from the one they followed during the Moro kidnapping.

At the beginning of this coverage, readers will find the text of that transcript as we received it. In the following pages (under the headline: "Noi brigatisti raccontiamo che..."), we print the transcript of our interview with the BR.

How did we get this interview and the transcript of their interrogation of Judge D'Urso from the BR? It was a fairly complicated business, the details of which we have of course already reported to the police. The first contact between a BR "delegate" and L'ESPRESSO dates back to the evening of 19 December. That evening, at 2030 hours, an unidentified person rang the intercom phone at the residence of our editor, Gianpaolo

Bultrini, announcing that he wished to speak with him on an urgent matter of business. Once admitted, the unidentified individual stated in peremptory and hurried tones that he was in a position to negotiate for an interview with the Red Brigades, producing as evidence a portion of the transcript of Judge D'Urso's interrogation and proof of its authenticity. He asked for written questions, immediately, to which written replies would be delivered.

Bultrini, who is not on the terrorism beat at L'ESPRESSO, suggested that he get in touch with me [Mario Scialoja], since I had been writing about terrorism for many years and had interviewed the BR at the time of the Sossi kidnaping. Bultrini telephoned me and we made a date for the following morning at the Canova bar on Piazza del Popolo. On hand with him was the unidentified messenger, who quickly laid out his proposal for me. At the time, I didn't attach too much credence to it, since I have had a lot of experience with smoke-peddlers and con-men offering "deals" of that kind. I replied, however, that I would need a couple of hours to write out a list of questions for the Red Brigades. And so we made another appointment, this time for Piazza San Pietro. There in front of St. Peter's, at 1400 hours, I handed the self-styled BR ambassador four typewritten pages containing 54 questions I had managed to come up with in that short time. My contact gave me no date or procedure for delivery of the replies.

Nine days went by without another word. That brought us to Tuesday morning, 30 December, when Bultrini called me in the office to tell me he had "got some mail." He came into the newsroom with a white envelope containing 13 typewritten pages of the questions and answers for the interview; 35 typewritten pages containing what the BR themselves styled, in an attached note, as "excerpts from the initial interrogation sessions" with D'Urso; a copy of their strategy resolution dated "October 1977"; mimeographed copies of the first five pamphlets the BR had handed out since they had kidnaped Judge D'Urso, and, finally, wrapped in thin cardboard, another color photograph (margins cropped) of the BR's prisoner, taken against the usual background of the red flag and, in the foreground, the placard bearing the same slogans that had appeared in the first photograph released immediately after the kidnaping. The magistrate's face looks far more tired and drawn than in the earlier picture. In place of his white shirt he is wearing a striped knit warmup jacket with a zipper front.

Bultrini had received the envelope from the same unidentified messenger who had seen us 9 days earlier; the man had come up to him suddenly on the street, near his house, and handed him the package.

A few explanations are called for in connection with the interview: The BR did not answer all my questions and, in some instances the questions they did answer were not quite the same as those I had sent them in writing. This, along with other things, tends to give a conversational tone to the interview: in other words, a question seems to tie in with the preceding answer. Actually, there was obviously no

dialogue, no give and take, no real continuity between an answer and the question which follows it. The reason why one might get that impression is that the BR people rewrote certain questions, and fitted them in with their answers.

#### Red Brigades Discuss Strategy

Rome L'ESPRESSO in Italian 11 Jan 81 pp 91-98

[Interview with members of the BR by Mario Scialoja in Rome, 19-30 December 1980]

[Text] For the first time, the Red Brigades speak out in real depth and detail of their intentions. They talk about the "repentant" terrorists in prison and about the Aldo Moro case. They hint at what they want in exchange for freeing D'Urso. They talk about the "internal crisis" in their own organization, and reject any offer of amnesty. It is a chilling indictment.

QUESTION: After Moro, D'Urso: isn't that a step backward, down from the "strategic level"? How do you explain it?

ANSWER: Whyever would it be? The Moro action was part of a campaign of attack on the imperialist state which fell into a phase of the conflict different from the present one. The Moro action, at the time, marked the culminating point in one phase of the guerrilla war: the armed propaganda phase. The objective then was to sink deep into the consciousness of the proletariat the knowledge that the armed struggle is necessary and strategically sound. The capture of D'Urso, unlike the Moro action, falls into a more advanced phase of conflict, in which the general order for the guerrilla war is: win over and organize the masses on the ground of armed struggle for communism.

QUESTION: Why do you say that the phase of conflict is more advanced?

ANSWER: The depth of the imperialist crisis has brought out the total irrelevance of working-class interests to capitalist requirements. The restructuring at all levels now going on in Italy is pushing whole strata of classes over onto the ground of revolutionary struggle. This state is capable of guaranteeing nothing but unemployment, super-exploitation, poverty, and prison. Not only the strategic needs, but the immediate material needs of the working masses and the proletariat are being inexorably crushed and annihilated under this system, by a government which no longer has anything to offer, committed only to saving itself. The struggle which the working and proletarian masses are engaged in for the satisfaction of their immediate needs is becoming, de facto, a power struggle. And that changes everything.

QUESTION: Don't the events at FIAT, though, stand as evidence to the contrary?

ANSWER: The FIAT struggle gave spontaneous and mass expression to strivings for autonomy and power that in no way indicate the end of a cycle

with all its illusions; on the contrary, it marks the beginning of a new cycle of struggle, kept smouldering all through the past 10 years, no matter how long it may be, no matter how difficult the conditions for its development may appear at first. For the first time in the recent history of the class struggle in Italy, proletarian antagonism was not expressed in a fight for demands relating to union platforms, but in power objectives to be used against a plan for political annihilation, in a defense of the job which heightened class unity, in a class autonomy that was translated into a mass attack on the unions and revisionists, even when those forces had tried to ride the tiger the better to kill it. Only the great backwardness we must admit still affects the revolutionary forces blocked the immediate precipitation of the organizational instruments that could guide and channel the power struggle that pitted the working class at FIAT against the bosses.

QUESTION: Briefly, then, are you saying that the masses are ready to make a revolution?

ANSWER: We are not all that naive. We say that the objective and subjective conditions exist right now for a decisive transition in the direction of civil war for communism. In other words, the conditions are there for the birth, out of the mass movement that is struggling against restructuring, of consolidated revolutionary mass organizations which, along with the Fighting Communist Party [PCC] would constitute a fundamental resolve to build the armed proletarian government. It is essentially this that constitutes the change of phase we were talking about. Our political line therefore must be developed in this direction, and take upon its shoulders all the problems which building the armed proletarian government may bring to light.

QUESTION: Could that perhaps mean that you intend, at some point, to exploit social tensions and climb on the back of the spontaneous movements tiger?

ANSWER: Quite the contrary. We are not interested in chasing after every outburst of proletarian anger, but in understanding that such explosions are the fruit of profound objective causes, whose source is in the fact that the capitalist system is historically obsolete. We must therefore set about building the alternative to it. [We shall start with the tensions now running high among the many layers of the proletariat, with the issues in their struggles; we must encourage the definition of "immediate programs," around which we can rally new support; we must contribute to the assertion and consolidation of the revolutionary entities which foster them.

QUESTION: Aren't these issues quite similar, though, to the arguments for autonomy which, until now, you have condemned?

ANSWER: Not in the slightest. In fact, the PCC's role will not fade away simply to be swallowed up in spontaneity; on the contrary it

takes on increased value because, in relation to the immediate programs and the revolutionary mass organizations, the Party must, more than ever, provide a general landmark. It must provide and propound the overall program for the transition to communism, and be able to place it in the correct dialectical context with the particular issues expressed by the struggle of the various worker and proletarian strata. The Party's initiative in this direction is essential if we are to reunite the proletariat politically. As you see, there is no change in our strategic line, merely an updating to qualify it to deal with the new and formidable conditions which are opening up great broad avenues toward the building of the armed proletarian government.

QUESTION: What has all of this to do with D'Urso's kidnaping?

ANSWER: The working-class prisoners would be able to tell you very clearly what it has to do with it. There is a reality, which the system's propaganda confuses or hides. The crisis has expanded the portion of the proletariat pushed out of the productive process, relegated to a position of chronic outsider status, and destitute of income, which now finds in extra-legal employment its sole chance for survival. The class breakdown effected by the bourgeoisie at the expense of hundreds of thousands of the proletariat has its military strongpoint in the imperialist prison system. Nor is that all: the murderous onslaught by Agnelli and his minions on the employed working class was designed to be rounded out with the imprisonment and destruction of the worker and proletarian vanguard. The figures speak for themselves: more than 35,000 proletarians are in prison, and more than 3,000 comrades are held in concentration camps.

QUESTION: Is what you are saying that there is no real distinction between the common criminal and the political prisoner?

ANSWER: The only criminals we know in this society are the Christian Democrat gang and the beasts of the government. The proletarians in prison are an integral part of the urban proletariat, and the overwhelming majority of them have identified their class interests with the struggle for communism. This is demonstrated by the fact that the criminal prison policy has failed, as a direct result of their decision to fight back, of the vast mobilization they have achieved behind the programs drawn up by the Committees for Struggle inside the prisons. The prison is indeed a military strongpoint for the bourgeoisie, but there has also been a trend toward political reconstitution among the proletariat, and that fact is of tremendous import in the balance of power between revolution and counterrevolution.

QUESTION: You still haven't explained what D'Urso has to do with it.

ANSWER: If at this juncture the prison system is the basic tool of the preventive counterrevolution, attacking the top levels of the Justice Ministry which runs the system is to attack "the heart of the state." Capturing D'Urso is already a major political victory which throws the enemy plan into disarray. Of itself, however, it would not have been sufficient had this guerrilla action not been in intimate

dialectic with the prison proletariat movement and in consonance with the immediate program objectives of the Committees for Struggle.

QUESTION: What objectives did you have in mind when you kidnaped D'Urso?

ANSWER: Two, basically. First of all, to strike a blow at the strategy for annihilation of the proletariat of which the imperialist state is the standard-bearer, and to drive home his guilt to a pig who passed along the orders from the Justice Ministry to slave-masters of the prison system. Secondly, but equally important, was a party initiative designed to open up new political spaces for the prison proletariat movement and its organizations; to lend them the voice that has been won by a thousand initiatives, to make a practical contribution to the pursuit of the goals of their struggle.

QUESTION: Did you, in this instance, do as you did with Moro? Study possible alternative targets for kidnaping, other than D'Urso?

ANSWER: There are always plenty of alternatives. As many as there are men and structures in this system. Sooner or later, the armed proletarian government will get around to all of them. In guerrilla war, you have to single out, at a specific political juncture, where the heart of the counterrevolutionary plan lies, and strike there. That is what was done with Moro, and that is what was done with D'Urso.

QUESTION: What, precisely, are you asking in exchange for D'Urso's life?

ANSWER: We are not asking anything. We have nothing to ask of this system. Our strategic objectives have been clear for years: destruction of all prisons and freedom for all proletarian prisoners. How much tactical progress we make toward these objectives is determined solely by the overall balance of power which the revolutionary movement can establish. Whereas we can evaluate these balances correctly, this system does not seem to us to be able to do as much. But perhaps this is a symptom of the crisis in which the bourgeoisie is floundering, apparently determined not to understand that war consists of battles won and lost, and that it has lost this one.

QUESTION: How is D'Urso bearing up?

ANSWER: Very well indeed. He is collaborating with proletarian justice. In addition to confirming the terms in which they planned the use of prison for annihilation, he named all those who worked with him, closely or at some remove.

QUESTION: How long will D'Urso's confinement last?

ANSWER: We are opposed to all prisons, including those in which we are forced to hold the enemies of the people. D'Urso, therefore, will stay there only as long as necessary to try him, to put his guilt on the record, so that a verdict can be reached under proletarian justice.

QUESTION: Does the fact that you kidnaped an individual without an escort mean that you wanted to avoid killings, or that you were not in a position to risk a "military" encounter?

ANSWER: Neither. As we have already explained, the standards for a guerrilla attack are political. The military level of the force to be fielded is consequent upon those standards, and we believe we have amply demonstrated that there is no target, no matter how well protected, escorted, or defended, that we cannot reach.

QUESTION: From your point of view, why is it that, within the span of a few months, and after years behind bars, militants like Fioroni, Peci, Viscardi, and -- apparently -- several BR members from Genoa, have suddenly started to talk?

ANSWER: Here we have to make a distinction, because the psychological counter-guerrilla forces have been out fishing with both hands. They began by creating a non-existent character: "the repentant terrorist." There is no such thing as repentance for a terrorist. What has happened is that a few individuals who had been living as parasites on the revolutionary movement for years decided it might be a smart move to join the carabinieri. In their new role they obviously tried to make points with the cops, with the result that they got a lot of comrades killed and a lot were arrested. These worms did nothing more or less than "confess" what would help this system send hundreds of comrades to prison. They are pitiful puppets, whom even proletarian justice would have a hard time endowing with a minimum of human dignity. There are not many of them, but there are enough, since the price the revolutionary movement has paid for failing to spot them in time is a very high one. Some criticism along this line has already been done, and insofar as we are concerned we have already managed to correct and raise to the new level of conflict the political spotters who screen our members. Very different, though, is the case of other comrades who under questioning, under torture, have admitted taking part in guerrilla actions. This was very wrong behavior, brought on by a lack of clarity, which resulted in their involving other comrades. Here again, though, we are not talking about repentance, but of some comrades' inability to grasp the new conditions of the class conflict, or the levels of repression of the imperialist state. Even though everyone has his own responsibilities, the problem is essentially one of shedding light, of achieving clarity. Both of these must come from the revolutionary movement, which has always been able to distinguish between the weaknesses that are part of its growth, and its enemies.

QUESTION: But we are no longer talking about a few individual crises: how can be so sure that what you have here is not the failure of a political line?

ANSWER: The political lines that have failed are the spontaneist and militarist lines, plus the fringes that used to call for armed struggle,

but who failed to understand the changed conditions of that struggle. The fact is that anybody who had viewed armed struggle as a form of struggle more radical than others, rather than a long-range strategy, given the virulence of the system's counteroffensive, has found himself politically disarmed and thus wound up mistaking his own defeat for that of the revolutionary movement. And this happens just as armed struggle has expanded its influence into broad strata of the proletariat, and just as, historically, the possibility of another great leap forward in the organization of proletarian power was dawning. It is imperative therefore that the guerrilla war come to terms with the problems involved in organizing the masses on the field of armed struggle. The Fighting Communist Party will prove that it is just that mainly in the way it shows it can do that job. Today, only the man who cannot see this imperative is in deep crisis.

QUESTION: Do you deny that there is a crisis in the Red Brigades?

ANSWER: In their Strategic Guidelines for 1978 the BR had perceived the new factors that distinguish the present phase. Despite that, we have been somewhat slow in pushing our critical assessment to the utmost and in fully accepting the tasks the class movement assigned us. For example, we were slow, after the spring campaign, to understand that going beyond the phase of armed propaganda pure and simple meant shouldering the difficult task of acting upon the various class strata to provide planned practicality to the revolutionary drives present among them, and in using this program as a springboard for a qualitative leap in mass organization. A great debate that has gone on over the past several months, inside the Organization and outside it, has led us today to great clarity, and has made it possible to lay down in the October 1980 Strategic Guidelines the basic thrusts in the political evolution that was required.

QUESTION: However did it happen that the conflict between your Strategic Guidelines and the Walter Alasia column was made public? Is that conflict still going on? Did Walter Alasia take part in the D'Urso kidnapping?

ANSWER: The BR's political debates have never been secret: they have been public and have involved, in addition of course to the structures of our Organization, the entire revolutionary movement. The worst foe we have had to deal with in this period has been an opportunist faction that has pervaded the entire armed struggle movement and which had picked up a few followers from our own ranks as well. Defeating this enemy was indispensable if we were to achieve a new and stronger unity. Making us with clarity was necessary to provide new drive to the whole movement. A few comrades in the Walter Alasia column -- which has been, historically and traditionally, one of the most valiant in our organization -- stubbornly insisted on militarist methods and on a wrong-headed conception of the armed struggle. So they went their own way. These comrades no longer have anything to do with us or with the Walter Alasia column, even though their confusion often leads them into foolishly provocative attitudes. The Walter Alasia column will manage to bring clarity into this business, too, showing no patience with mislaid ideas and outstretched hands toward sincere revolutionaries.

QUESTION: In some of your documents you reported the fact that the "militant revolutionaries" who had been captured had been subjected to torture: have you specific evidence or instances to tell us about?

ANSWER: We are not dealing with instances any longer, but with a widespread procedure generally adopted by the cops under this system. Practically every comrade captured is taken to a secret place, hooded, and subjected to every imaginable kind of torture. We should not be surprised, though, because Cossiga's special laws sanctioned precisely this sort of thing: they give the carabinieri and the DIGOS the right to hold captured revolutionaries in their sole custody for at least 4 days. That is tantamount to a license to torture. To cite only one case, the most recent: Comrade Maurizio Iannelli, immediately upon his capture, was hooded and taken to a secret apartment, where he was tortured for 2 days. Only because of his courageous behavior was it possible for us to report this fact immediately, although the establishment press hastened to cover it up with government press releases.

QUESTION: In hindsight, does the decision to "execute" Moro look to you like a mistake?

ANSWER: The very fact that we are asked that question almost 3 years after that battle is in itself the answer to it. If, after almost 3 years, the wounds inflicted on the imperialist government party have not yet healed, we cannot see what other guerrilla action could have been more effective.

QUESTION: Why didn't you have anything to say about the charge levelled at some of the "7 April" group, alleging that they were members of your "strategic leadership"?

ANSWER: There were those arrested on 7 April, on 8 April, and on 9 April. Every day the special corps cops arrest dozens of comrades. Because this is the essence of the imperialist state's strategy: to wipe out the entire revolutionary movement. This is the line the BR were mobilized to defeat by creating the alternative of the armed proletarian government. To try arguing with some imbecilic reactionary judge is not exactly our political line. To understand the rapport between us and the magistracy one need only recall the names of the judges we have executed.

QUESTION: What do you think of the "repentant terrorists," and why is it that you do not seem to have paid much attention to them?

ANSWER: It is not true that we haven't paid them much attention. We have already said that there is no such thing as a "repentant terrorist": that is an invention of the system's propaganda. As for spies and traitors, the only attention paid them is what we would pay to lice: when you find one you crush it. The fate that awaits them has already been spelled out unequivocally in Nuoro prison, at the suove... Furthermore, from now on they will be afraid of their own shadows, because there is no doubt that they are walking dead men.

QUESTION: Is it true that after the defeats suffered by Prima Linea and other minor groups, many of their militants have joined the BR?

ANSWER: The experience of the revolutionary movement in recent years has developed in a variety of organized forms which expressed, in partial form, needs and requirements coming from the disparate components of the urban proletariat. To cite an example, we would remind you of the NAP, Armed Proletarian Nuclei, and what they meant to the prisoner proletariat. Anyone working to build the Party must know how to incorporate the fragmentary movements into a single grand design. And this is what the BR have always done.

QUESTION: What do you think of the calls for desertion that are being heard even inside the armed party?

ANSWER: A few bourgeois brats, just recently, went on vacation and thought they could play with the class war. Today, though, the conflict between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat is raging full-force, and only because the conditions are ripe for a great revolutionary advance, and the bourgeoisie is pulling its children out. We would like to desert the assembly line, all harmful and deadly jobs, unemployment, the neglect of the slums, the savagery of this society's life. But we cannot do that by running crying back to our dad-dad. To free ourselves from this wretchedness we must fight, do away with the capitalist system, and build a communist society. Desert, you say? We are not joking! We have only just begun.

QUESTION: There are people who have aired the idea of amnesty: in your view, could amnesty help stem the upward spiral of violence and make the conflict less "barbarous"?

ANSWER: Imperialism is aiming at extermination, at concentration camps, so as to have some chance of survival. It is this system that is barbarous and violent; it is the Christian Democrat gang and its lackeys who are bloodthirsty. We find it impossible to imagine a peaceful society so long as they are still on the face of the earth.

QUESTION: How did you know the itinerary Moro would take as he left his house on 10 March? Some people are certain that you had a spy (willing or unwilling) among his family (or his friends): could you say something about that?

ANSWER: After 10 years that the BR has been in existence you still haven't learned that proletarian intelligence and the guerrilla organization can go wherever it likes. It is simply a question of political will, and of having an organizational concept suited to the pace of the proletarian revolution in the imperialist metropolises. In planning and carrying out the Moro action we relied, as always, only on these weapons.

QUESTION: Did you really think you could free Moro alive? When the 55 days were up, what would you have taken in exchange for him?

ANSWER: You are so used to constructing establishment truths that you have become a prisoner of your own sleight-of-mind. There were no fewer than nine communiques issued during that period, simple, clear messages that raised the issue of the communist prisoners and asking that some of them be freed. An affirmative reply, that would have freed some of our comrades, we said, would unquestionably have freed our prisoner.

QUESTION: How is it that in his letters Moro never once named the men who were escorting him and were slain?

ANSWER: Obviously because he didn't give a damn about them.

QUESTION: Is it true that the BR people who were holding Moro delayed his execution by 48 hours?

ANSWER: No.

QUESTION: Was Moro told he was going to be killed? How did he react?

ANSWER: Yes, he was told. You can read about his reaction in his memoirs, which we made public. Precisely because he was a Christian Democrat, he knew his "friends" in the party well, and he had no doubts as to who should get the real blame for our not having suspended his sentence.

QUESTION: Is it true that a statement from Fanfani that the DC would be willing to open negotiations would have sufficed to suspend Moro's death sentence?

ANSWER: The issue we had raised was the prisoners. It was a political issue which the terrified ringleaders of this system were afraid to touch. They thought they could make a problem go away by pretending it didn't exist. If you bear in mind the fact that the revolutionary forces make this issue central -- as the capture of D'Urso shows -- you see that immobilism, the "non-line" the American experts suggested to the stupid Christian Democrats, certainly did not encourage solutions other than the one we chose.

QUESTION: They say that, at Moro's direction, one of his colleagues delivered documents from his files to you, and that they supported statements he had made to you: is that true? What documents were they?

ANSWER: We had no dealings of any sort with anyone whomsoever. As for the documents, the ones we had taken when we captured him were sufficient for our purposes.

QUESTION: Were there letters which Moro wrote or wanted to write, but which you did not approve or which you destroyed?

ANSWER: No. Everything he wrote has been made public. And it seems to us that that is quite enough.

QUESTION: What is the true story of what happened in the apartment on Via Andalù?

ANSWER: It was an ordinary accident: a drain was rotten and there was water leaking in. Why in the world do people try to see all sorts of sinister meanings in that, as if everybody didn't know what Roman landlords are capable of?

QUESTION: A lot of people (from Zaccagnini to Berlinguer to Pecchioli...) insist that the BR are "run" or at least getting help from one of the foreign intelligence services: what can you say to that?

ANSWER: Those eminent gentlemen should merely say precisely what they are talking about, and prove that it is not merely the product of their sick imaginations. We find that the intelligence services and their tricks and spooks of all kinds are their favorite weapon for use against the proletariat. In order to deny the truth of a fact that won't let them sleep, they have fabricated a bedtime story of foreign plots and conspiracies, of dark and secret maneuvers. By now, though, they are reasonably ones who believe it -- and maybe some of the government's feather-merchants. The proletarian war is growing and has little time to waste on their silly tales.

QUESTION: Is it true that the Palesians of the PLO are supplying you with a lot of weapons? In exchange for what?

ANSWER: We believe that in the era of the proletarian anti-imperialist war there must be a rebirth of proletarian internationalism; an internationalism compounded of proletarian solidarity, militant help, and

political support among the forces which, in the struggle against imperialism, are fighting for the peoples' liberation from oppression, are battling for communism. Revisionist rhetoric cannot conceive of any rapport among the antiimperialist movements that is not one of selfish convenience and squalid, despicable manipulation. It isn't like that among us. Our solidarity with the Palestinian people in their struggle against Zionist imperialism is complete and unconditional. Certainly it will take more than the slander and calumny of those who have simply exploited this struggle to make us change our minds.

QUESTION: Do you have relations or contacts with rank-and-file PCI cadres who do not share the Party line?

ANSWER: The PCI is right now beginning the final laps of an irreversible process of identification with the interests of the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie has assigned the PCI a role which would make it the state within the working class. Berlinguer and his hangers-on are completely comfortable in that role. Obviously, this counterrevolutionary function gives rise to some dissent within the Party, but the faulty consciences of those workers who still carry Berlinguer's party card in their pockets will inevitably turn to the knowledge that they must get out of it. Our strategy is to win over every proletarian, every worker, to the revolutionary line of the armed struggle for communism and to organize that struggle in the entities which make up the system of the armed proletarian government. In the course of this lengthy process, even the most backward fringes of the worker movement will perforce, sooner or later, awaken to their class interests.

QUESTION: How would you describe the political and social background of your most recent recruits?

ANSWER: The same as it always was. Our roots sink deep into the urban proletariat and our cadres come from its vanguard. The problem of working-class centrality is not a sociological, but a political one. This means that all the other strata of the proletariat are organized around the interests of the working class. It is not a metaphysical or idealistic problem, either, though, and therefore the BR comrades are predominantly workers.

QUESTION: Have you had political (or other) contacts with Albania?

ANSWER: No.

QUESTION: What do you think of communism in the USSR and in China? For this future society you say you are fighting for, do you have any particular model -- already complete or described -- in mind?

ANSWER: The issues involved in building a communist society are not new ones on which it is permissible to pontificate as if the topic were laboratory experiments rather than a movement involving billions of people all over the world. Our roots are and will always be Marxism-Leninism and the Chinese cultural revolution. We have got into the way

of looking at communism not as a model, but as a long process with planetary dimensions, which has no time for image-molding dreams, but demands historically valid answers. This does not alter the fact that we are firmly convinced that anybody who implements an expansionist policy which oppresses the freedom of peoples, whatever name he may adopt, belongs to the imperialist alinement.

QUESTION: At this point, do you still think you can stir up an insurrectionist movement in Italy through political violence?

ANSWER: We have never considered an insurrectionalist explosion. On the contrary, we believe in the historical possibility of building an armed proletarian system of government through politico-military organization of the two basically crucial factors: the Fighting Communist Party and the revolutionary rank-and-file organizations, through an entire phase of history. There is no doubt that this will not be a linear process, but that it will rather progress by dialectical leaps, and in the last analysis the full force of revolutionary war will destroy the bourgeois state and will build the communist society. For us, this is not merely a hope, but a certainty that feeds on the thoughts and aspirations of the proletariat.

QUESTION: Your former column commander Riccardo Dura, according to testimony by some of the Genoese "penitents," used to employ very harsh methods, including blackmail, with his men: is what they said true? What do you think of it?

ANSWER: This is the filthiest, most cowardly invention of the psychological counter-guerrilla war. Roberto was a great leader of our Organization, loved and admired like few others. With his humanity, with his ability to live like a communist along with everybody else, with his support of the comrades in the most painful moments, he gave us more than anything the government's tired hacks can ever understand. We are proud to have had him beside us all these years, just as we feel that all comrades who have died for communism are our brothers.

QUESTION: Doesn't the killing of proletarians, simple men far removed from the seats of power, give you problems of conscience, or perhaps of ideological consistency?

ANSWER: When did the BR ever strike at innocent proletarians? This has never happened, not even by mistake. Of course, if you are talking about mercenaries in uniform who have sold their class identity to the bourgeoisie and to its interests, thus betraying their origins, and who have transformed themselves into savage murderers of the proletariat, we believe that there is no need for any scrap of pity toward them. We have already told them that they ought to go into another line of work. We have no need to repeat that advice.

QUESTION: Does that "soldier," Dalla Chiesa, look to you like a crafty and dangerous rival: like an enemy worthy of respect?

ANSWER: No. He's just a cop who was handed full power.

## BUDGET MINISTRY OFFICIAL: DEPARTMENTS MUST CUT BY ONE-SIXTH

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 20 Jan 81 p 6

[Article by Hans O. Alfredsson]

[Text] One-sixth of state spending must be cut out during the next 4 years if Sweden is to straighten out its economy.

"A tough job," commented undersecretary Bengt Westerberg of the Budget Ministry when he presented this information at an economic seminar in Stockholm Monday.

The seminar was the first in a series to be held in January and February by the State Institute for Personnel Administration and Training (SIPU).

Department heads and other representatives of state departments and authorities listened intently to Bengt Westerberg's drastic description of the Swedish economy:

"We will find out whether it is an impossible task to cut out so much state spending (exclusive of interest). It is a job calling for courageous politicians, politicians who also have the pedagogical ability to explain how one can abandon all the pledges made in various areas."

The four future steps on the road to thrift (the savings plan in the fall was the first) will be considerably harder according to Bengt Westerberg.

Most of the future efforts to bring the economy into balance must occur in the form of savings, he said. Taxes cannot be increased much more--regardless of which government comes to power.

"It is also quite necessary now to do something about the automatic factors in the national budget. A very large part of state spending is for so-called regulated expenditures. If the state is to be able to save money transfers to households and municipal subsidies will have to be affected."

Among these so-called automatic expenditures are such things as old-age pensions, interest on the national debt, housing measures, teachers' salaries, children's welfare services and aid to developing countries.

According to Bengt Westerberg the state will now be forced to look at such items in the budget too. This may happen as early as this spring when the new savings bill is presented.

#### New Generation

Bengt Westerberg also tried to explain why the nation's economy is in the shape it is just now. A very large part of the explanation can be found here at home in his opinion and he ventured a speculation:

"I think the situation has been influenced by the fact that we now have a new generation of politicians. The old generation with its own personal memories of poverty and need may have placed greater emphasis on safeguarding efforts that created resources."

The new generation of politicians has its background in the public sector to a large extent or else they are career politicians:

"They have a very deficient grasp of the problems in industry. Many have never seen a factory from the inside!"

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## SIX SDP ECONOMISTS URGE PARTY TO BACK CUTS

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 19 Feb 81 p 2

[Editorial]

[Text] Social Democrats must make a thorough review of their policy. This warning is sounded in an article in ARBETET (Social Democratic) written by six Social Democratic national economists, including Nils Lundgren and Villy Bergstrom.

The six take Sweden's basic economic problems as their starting point: the important thing is to increase production and reduce consumption. Since the situation is urgent forceful and unconventional measures are needed.

With regard to the production side the Social Democrats stress the need for Swedish production costs to rise more slowly than those in the rest of the world so we can regain market shares both inside and outside Sweden. It is also necessary to accept rising profits in order to stimulate investment and increased industrial employment.

Other demands made in the article are a radical pruning of the bouquet of industrial subsidies and measures that would increase mobility on the labor market.

With regard to consumption the six economists strongly emphasize that checking the expansion of the public sector is unavoidable in a policy aimed at economic balance.

They feel it is necessary to make concessions on the big spending items: custodial services, childcare services, education, transfers. Lundgren & Co. in other words are presenting ideas which when they come from nonsocialists--and are worded more cautiously--automatically set off a Social Democratic condemnation: "social disarmament."

One example of a desirable intervention in the public sector mentioned in the ARBETET article is increased financing of charges. "Is it reasonable that the one-fifth of all Swedish parents who put their children into a daycare institution should receive a tax-free subsidy of 35,000 kronor per child from the other four-fifths?" the writers ask.

The six economists are asking the Social Democrats to slaughter some of their holiest cows. They must accept the fact that it is good for a company to have high profits. They must strongly support limiting the public sector, especially in areas traditionally very dear to the hearts of Social Democrats.

But of course the six are right when they say that political measures that were correct in the past are no longer viable. And party leaders with economic insight undoubtedly sympathize with the views of the Social Democratic economists. This is a question of shallow party tactics versus a feeling of national responsibility.

One can say of course that the proposals in the ARBETET article would require the Social Democrats to approach the government's policy instead of attacking it. But actually the six national economists go farther than that; they are asking the Social Democrats to do more than the government has so far dared or been able to do to make private firms more profitable and to sharply cut public spending.

Now the package presented by the critical economists also includes things it should be easy for Social Democrats to swallow, higher taxes for example. But the major emphasis of the proposals is not there but in the call for a new orientation.

We should know how the Social Democrats react to this officially by May at the latest. The party's so-called crisis group under the leadership of Ingvar Carlsson is expected to present its economic balance proposals at that time.

But whether or not the Social Democrats listen to the six national economists the government and the government parties should do so. The debate article in ARBETET should help put some starch into them.

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## SUDDEN WEAKNESS OF KRONOR AIDS STOCK MARKET

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 22 Feb 81 p 34

[Commentary by Lars Ramklint]

[Excerpts] Strong foreign interest in Swedish stocks is one of the reasons why the stock exchange has been setting records in recent weeks both in terms of prices and in the volume of trading. Foreign purchases of Swedish stocks in recent months have involved close to half a billion kronor according to a broker on the Stockholm Exchange.

Day after day the headlines over the DAGENS NYHETER stock market quotations have exclaimed: "Record Trading," "New Payment Highs," "Index Highest in New Year," etc.

Since the beginning of the year the market level has risen 11 percent. The climb has been broken only by brief slumps. And trading just seems to go on increasing. This week a new sales record was set for stocks, 85 million--twice the level considered a good day for the stock market just a few months ago.

Something has definitely happened. The stock market has come alive and brokers have started to make comparisons with the happy decade of the 1960's.

Many are surprised that this upturn has happened now when the state of the market is weak and problems are piling up for the Swedish economy. It would have been natural if the stock exchange had also declined after last year's gain of 22 percent.

#### Several Reasons

Thus one can definitely state that the upturn now is occurring in spite of the state of the market, not because of it.

And if the stock market upturn is not based on business conditions the explanation must be sought in structural changes.

These reasons are probably the most important: large foreign purchases; the success of tax fund savings; tax rebates on distribution income; the "follow-the-leader" behavior of stock savers.

The foreign buying interest is a completely new element on the Stockholm Exchange. For some time certain London brokers have shown considerable interest in Swedish securities.

Another reason for the large foreign purchases is that the National Bank has relaxed the requirement that the purchase of all securities must be paid for in so-called switch currency. Normally anyone wishing to buy securities in Sweden must also sell other Swedish securities here at the same time. But for some time foreign citizens have had the right within certain limits to buy Swedish stocks without using switch currency.

This has created the basis for foreigners to become net purchasers of Swedish securities. And that has happened which explains why the effect on the stock exchange has been so strong.

Even though things are brightening for the stock exchange there are some clouds on the horizon. This week the tax fund savings plan was attacked by Kjell-Olof Feldt who promised in parliament that the assets would be removed if the Social Democrats come into power.

And we can't be guaranteed that the foreign interest will continue in the long run. International capital is volatile by nature. Buyers have flocked from one stock exchange to another. When they lose interest in a market the decline in demand is enough to rock an exchange as small as the Swedish one. If foreign stock owners started selling off stocks in massive quantities the effect could easily be chaotic.

The political consequences increased foreign ownership could have is an interesting question. Can a government--regardless of its political color--remove the prerequisites for a healthy exchange development if it knows that the consequences will be a flight of foreign capital with the subsequent risk of a stock market collapse?

I don't know and I think stock savers have obtained a strong ally in the form of the foreign bankers.

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## CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY SUFFERS WORST JOBLESS RATE IN 50 YEARS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 12 Feb 81 p 19

[Article by Bo A. Ericsson]

[Excerpts] The entire Swedish construction industry with roughly 300,000 employees is headed into the worst crisis since the 1930's. Unemployment is rising to record levels and one company after another is going out of business or cutting back. The alarm signals are now coming from both employers and sectors of the construction branch and on Thursday a petition will be presented to the government demanding a change in order to avert catastrophe.

It is not always the case that the organizations in the branch form a largely united front, but that is happening now:

"Build Sweden out of the crisis." That is what the Construction Contractors' Association and the Construction Union will demand when they call on the government today.

"Increase construction, that will provide us with the motor the economy needs just now." That will be the main theme at the conference the Construction Workers' Union will hold at the same time in People's House in Stockholm.

"The branch has serious problems at all levels today," Construction Workers' chairman Bertil Whinberg said in a DAGENS NYHETER interview. From planning and construction to the materials industry and building firms. There is not enough construction going on.

At the same time unemployment among construction workers has increased more than 40 percent in a single year. Early in the fall there was a shortage of building projects, especially in Stockholm--and the trend is continuing.

This means that today over 7 percent of construction workers on the average are unemployed and the slump is continuing.

This can be compared with rates of 1.7 percent in the metal industry, 1.9 in municipal jobs and 0.8 for white-collar jobs in industry.

"When it comes to jobs 1981 is already a lost year. No measures can have an effect. Now we must try to save 1982," said Whinberg.

The situation today and the gloomy forecasts for the future have three main reasons, Whinberg said.

The government's savings plan for local communities will lead to a freezing of many building investments. Several county councils have revised investment plans only a year old to the point where they are almost unrecognizable.

Energy policy has been "placed on hold"--as long as nothing is decided no investments are made either in the direction of developing alternative energy sources or toward hot-water pipelines from nuclear power plants, for example.

Housing is too expensive--social housing policy is being eroded and soon people won't be able to afford housing.

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## BRIEFS

MERCHANT MARINE DECLINES--The Swedish merchant fleet continues to decline. In 1980 the tonnage declined by 326,000 gross tons or around 8 percent, bringing it down to the 1961 level. New-built tonnage has not been so small since 1949 according to SCB [Central Statistics Bureau]. Not a single foreign vessel was delivered in 1980. That has not happened since 1945. In all 26 ships, 455,000 gross tons, were sold abroad. That represents 11 percent of the tonnage of the total merchant fleet. [Text] [Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 20 Jan 81 p 4] 6578

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